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DISCRIMINATION OF INTERNATIONAL
MEDICAL GRADUATE PHYSICIANS BY
MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS:
IMPACT, LAW AND REMEDY
Saeid B. Anini"

INTRODUCTION
Professional and political concerns about the increasing numbers of
International Medical School Graduates (IMGs), thosewho graduate from
foreign medical schools and enter United States residency programs, has
re-emerged during the past two years.! There is growing pressure by
many national organizations, such as the Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC), to limit the number of IMG physicians?
Previous attempts to limit the number ofsuch graduates who fill residency
positions failed mostly because many IMGs enroll in residency programs
located in inner cities, rural communities, and poor neighborhoods, thus
offering medical care to indigent patient populations that United States
medical school graduates generally choose to avoid? The three main
arguments made for limiting the size of IMGs are :

Independent Consultant and Private Attorney, Cleveland, Ohio. Formally, Aszoraale
Professor of Epidemiology and Biostatistics; Associate Professor of Reproductive Biology;
Associate Professor of General Medical Sciences (Oncology). B.S., Institute of Statistics and
Information Science-Tehran, Iran, 1977; M.S., Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology 1979. N ,S.
University of Iova, 1980; Ph.D., University of Iowa, 1983; M.B.A., Case Western Recerve
University, 1993; J.D., Case Western Reserve University, 199S.
'See John K. Inglehart, The Quandry Over Graduatesof ForeignMedicalSchools m the
UnitedStates, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1679 (1996).
'See Michael E. Whitcomb, Correcting the Oversupply of Spccialists by Limiting
Residenciesfor GraduatesofForeignMedical Sdools, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 454 (1995),
'Foreign Physicians: Exchange Visitor Program Becoming Major Route to Practicing in
U.S. Underserved Areas. GAO HEHS-97-27. Available from the U.S. General Accounting Office,
P.O. Box 6015, Gaithersberg, MD. 20884-6015.
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(1) the current estimated thirty percent over-population of the
United States physician market;
(2) over two-thirds of IMGs stay in the United States after
completing their residency program; and
(3) allowing IMGs to enter the residency programs artificially
changes the market equilibrium by infusing IMGs to the
currently saturated market, and thus discourages intelligent
United States born students from entering United States
medical schools.4
For many years, IMGs were a significant factor in the United States health
care delivery market. For example, as Table 1 shows, of about 720,000
practicing physicians in the United States in 1995, about 165,000 (twentythree percent) were IMGs of which only 19,275 (1994 data) were United
States-born, but received their medical degrees overseas.

TABLE 1
Number of Graduates of U.S. and Foreign Medical Schools
Practicing as Allopathic Physicians in the United States.5
Category
All graduates
U.S. Medical Schools
International Medical
Schools Graduates
US.-born
Foreign-born

1985

1989

1994

1995

511,090
398,430
112,660

559,988
437,165
122,823

632,121
483,039
149,082

720,325
554,827
165,498

16,344
96,316

18,905
103,918

19,275
129,807

-

Moreover, of all IMG physicians who come to the United States to attend
residency programs, about seventy-five percent decide to stay and practice

4

Id.

5

Inglehart, supra note 1, at 1679.
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medicine in this country.6 While some 1MG physicians become staff
physicians in hospitals, a large majority practice medicine in a solo or
small group setting (Table 2).
TABLE 2
Total Physicians and IMGs by Activity

for 1980 and 1995.
Activity

Total

IMGs

Total Physicians

467,879

Patient Care
Office Based Practice
Hospital Based Practice
Residents/Fellows
Full-Time Staff
Other Prof. Activity
Medical Teaching
Administration
Research
Other
Not Classified
Inactive
Address unknown

376,512
272,000
104,512
62,042
42,470
38,404
7,942
12,209
15,377
2,676
20,629
25,744
6,390

Total

IMGs

97,726

720,325

165,49S

72,935
45,764
27,171
11,424
15,747
8,656
1,589
1,533
4,918
636
10,235
2,731
3,169

582,131
427,275
164,856
96,352
58,504
43,312
9,489
16,345
4,940
3,158
20,579
72,326
1,977

136,812
94,920
41,892
22,552
19,340
7,494
1,672
2,217
2,835
770
9,486
11,127
579

With the medical delivery system transforming from the customary feefor-service to a managed care and integrated delivery system, most IMG
physicians lawfully practicing medicine in this country find themselves
being discriminated against orjust left out by managed care organizations.
This paper will discuss these various issues in detail and identify laws that
could possibly protect IMGs from possible unfair discrimination or

6
See Fitzhugh Mullan, et al., MedicalMigrationandthe PhysicianWortjforce,273 JAMA
1521 (1995).
7
AMA Report, PhysiciansCharacteristicsandDistribution in the U S., 1996-1997(1997-
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competition, and protect managed care organizations from false
allegations.
The next section of this paper reviews the facts about IMGs and the
recent attempts aimed at reducing the number of IMG residents in the
United States. Further sections deal with managed care organizations
(MCOs) and their relationships with physicians, in particular, IMGs. Also
there will discussion regarding discrimination against IMG physicians.
Legal theories will be addressed under which an IMG physician may bring
a lawsuit against discriminatory MCO practice. The theories discussed
include common law legal remedies under contract and tort claims.
Statutory theories such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Section 1981,
and antitrust laws will also be considered. Finally, this article discusses
remedies under state statutes such as "Physician Protection Acts" that
various states are attempting to enact in order to protect physicians from
unjust termination by HMOs.
BACKGROUND
International Medical Graduates (IMGs)
and the United States Residency Program
During the 1960s and 1970s, IMGs were actively sought due to the
shortage of physicians in many United States hospitals.8 While it is still
cost-effective, as well as quicker, to import a qualified physician than to
provide four years of training at a United States medical school, the
situation has changed significantly in recent years because of the
emergence of managed health care delivery systems. Now, IMGs are
reluctantly offered spots not taken by United States medical graduates
(USMGs). While the number graduating from United States medical
schools has remained stable, about 17,000 a year since the early 1980s, the
number of IMGs entering United States residency programs has increased
from 2201 in 1988, to 5891 in 1994, an increase of about 170% (Table 3).
INMGs include not only immigrant physicians, but also United States
citizens who get their medical education in other countries and return to
the United States after graduating from foreign medical schools. 9

8See Anne Stein, ChangeofHeart?,AM. MED. NEWS, July 22, 1996, availablein 1996 WL

7990496 (rising discrimination against international medical graduates).
9Id. See also, supra note 3, at Table 1, and infra note 10, at Table 3.
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TABLE 3
Graduates of U.S. and International Medical Schools
Entering U.S. Residency Programs, 1988 to 1994'

Year

Graduates of
U.S. Medical
Schools

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

17,233
17,292
17,435
16,923
16,771
17,086
16,869

Graduates of Foreign
Medical Schools
U.S. Born
Foreim-Born
1,401
1,449
1,531
1,296
1,236
1,166
810

2,201
2,875
3,580
3,791
4,877
5,517
5,891

Despite the tough talk against IMGs in recent years and concerted efforts
at restricting IMG enrollments in United States residency programs, the
latest statistics show that at least seventy-seven hospitals in the United
States are dependent on the IMG residents, and many more have a
significant need for their services." Nevertheless, the most popular
solution for reducing the number of physicians entering the United States
physician market is centered around eliminating the number of 1MG
residency slots. 2 In fact, the Council on Graduate Medical Education
(COGME) has recently recommended the number of residency slots be
reduced from 142% ofthe number of USMGs to 110%," 3 which vill result

'0 lnglehart, supra note 1, at 1680 (referringto Table 1, data complied from the
Association of American Medical Colleges).
"See Gail Scott, Is a Home-Grown Doctor in the House? Those Studied Abroad are
Worried by Cut in Residencies, THE STAR-LEGER(Newark, N.J.) Feb. 9, 1997,availablein1997

WL 8044486. See also, Iglehart, supra notes 1, and Mullan, supra note 6.
2
See Iglehart, supra note 1, at 1679.
"Council on Graduate Medical Education, Fourth Report: Recommendations to Improve
Access to Health CareThrough PhysicianWorkforce Reform, WVashington, DC: Health Rezources
and Services Administration, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services (1994). See also.

Congressional Testimony by Dr. Spencer Foreman on Tuesday, June 11, 1996, availablemn 1996
WL 10164908.
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in eliminating about 5400 residency slots ordinarily filled by IMGs. t4
Some states are heavily dependent on IMGs to man their hospitals, and it
would be problematic to abruptly cut the supply of IMGs to those
hospitals. For example, more than fifty percent of all hospital residents in
New York City are IMGs, as are more than forty percent in North Dakota
and more than fifty-seven percent in New Jersey (Table 4). Nationwide,
IMGs make up nearly twenty-four percent of all medical residents."5
TABLE 4
States with the highest percentage of IMGs
in Residency Programs. 6
No. Of IMGs
Residents

State
New Jersey
New York
Nevada
North Dakota
Illinois
Connecticut
Total U.S.

1,704
5,459
43
49
1,696
594
19,677

As Percent IMG Of
All Residents
57.5%
45.1
43.0
40.2
36.5
36.4
23.9

Competition for Residency
Graduates of United States and international medical schools do not
generally compete for the same residency positions.'7 The majority of
United States medical school graduates compete for positions by
participating in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in their
fourth year of medical school.18 On the other hand, the majority of IMGs

14Seesupranote 8 (1994 data in table 3). This change will impact approximately 5400 IMG

enrollments (142% times 16,869 minus 110% times 16,869 = 5,398).

'5 See infra note 15, Table 4.
6
' Data is complied from the American Medical Association master file.
"See Whitcomb, supra note 2, at 454.
"8 Report from the NRMP: Results of the NationalResident MatchingProgramfor 1994,
69 ACAD. MED. 508-10 (1994).
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fill residency positions that are either not offered by the matching program
or not filled by United States graduates.' 9 American graduates are always
given preference in residency positions.20
Required Visa
There are three types of IMG physicians who participate in residency
programs in the United States:
(1) citizens of other countries who are in the United States on
temporary or exchange visas (i.e., J-1 visa) or H-lB work
permit which can be converted to permanent residency in the
United States,
(2) immigrants who are naturalized American citizens or have
permanent-resident status, and
(3) native-born American citizens who graduated from foreign
medical schools and have returned to the United States for
advanced training. 2'
To enter residency training, IMGs must satisfy American standards
established by the Educational Commission for Foreign (International)
Medical Graduates, as well as the requirements from state licensing
boards.2" Those who decide to stay in the United States do so in
compliance with standard immigration procedures and find employment
based on their qualifications and prevailing market conditions. Recently,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was considering
eliminating the H-lB status and only allowing IMGs to obtain training
with the J-1 visa.23 This will require all IMGs (discussed in group (1)),
with a few exceptions, to return to their home countries after completing
their residency training. Under the proposed plan, an 1MG could still
receive an H-lB visa if he or she has a state or teaching hospital
19

d

2

Michael E. Whitcomb & Rebecca S. Miller, Comparison of JMG-Depondcnt andNon1MG-Dependenciesin the NationalResidentMatcdingProgram,276 JAMA 700(1996). Sce also,
Filipino Reporter, Vol 24, No. 24, June 13, 1996.
2
Marvin R. Dunn &Rebecca S. Miller, The Sh ifingSandsofGraduate fcdicaEducation,

276 JAMA 710 (1996).
'See Mullan, supra note 6, at 1522.
Mike Mitka, IMGsRepel FederalEffort to CloseImmigrationDoor,39 A.. MED, NEWS,

(1996), available in 1996 WL 7990140 (international medical graduates; H-1B and J-1 nonimmigrant classifications).
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sponsorship.24 The core issue in deciding what type of visa is appropriate
for MG residents is to decide whether residency is a training program or
a specialty occupation.25
Who Pays for Residency Training
The cost of residency training is generally financed through public and
private revenues from third-party payments for medical care. 26 Medicare
and Medicaid programs are crucial sources of funding for teaching
hospitals because they make payments for graduate medical education and
set no limit on the number of residents they will support.27 The largest
explicit source of funding for graduate medical education, Medicare,
makes direct medical education payments to hospitals for residents'
stipends, faculty salaries, related administrative expenses, and institutional
overhead allocated to residency programs, as well as an indirect medicaleducation adjustment to per-case payments. 2 During 1995, Congress
considered revisions in the Medicare law regarding the direct and indirect
support of residency programs.29 Specifically, it proposed limiting the
number of residency positions as well as making sure that such funding
first be made available to USMGs.3"
Efforts in Reducing IMGs
In the past several years there have been systematic efforts by the
government and private medical associations to reduce the number of
IMGs by making it more difficult for IMGs to receive required visas3" and
by cutting Medicare support for IMGs in United States residency
32
programs.
Similarly, in years past, several restrictions were sought for the use
of federal Medicare money to partially finance IMG residency programs.
For example, in 1985 then Senator Robert Dole (R-Kansas) introduced
legislation that would have terminated Medicare payments for residency
24

Id.

25Id.
26

1d.

27

Inglehart, supra note 1, at 1679.
8Dunn, supra note 21, at 710.
29
2

1d.
301d.
31

'

d. at note 21, at 712. See also, 28 AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 9, 1996.
Id. at note 21, at 711. See also, Whitcomb, supra note 2, at 455.

2

DISCRMNATION OFINTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS

1999]

positions filled by graduates of foreign medical schools who were not
United States citizens. 3 The measure was never enacted. 4 During the
debate over health care reform in 1993 and 1994, proposals supported by
the Clinton administration and several congressional committees called for
a strict limit on the number of physicians allowed to enter residency
programs. 35 This plan would have effectively closed United States
training positions to all but a few IMGs. 36 The reform died with no
legislation enacted. 37 The fiscal-year 1997 budget the Clinton
administration submitted to Congress proposed a freeze on the current
number ofresidencies supported by Medicare, ameasure advocated
by Dr.
3
Medicine.
of
Institute
the
of
president
Kenneth I. Shine,
In 1995, as part of the Republican effort to balance the federal
budget, Congress again considered reducing Medicare support for
residency positions filledbyIMGs. 39 Testifyingbefore the Senate Finance
Committee in July of 1995, Association of American Medical Colleges
president, Dr. Jordan J. Cohen, said:
While the association should consider all available options for
addressing this oversupply [of physicians), it should first and
foremost pursue options to diminish the number of international
medical graduates [1MG] pursuing graduate medical education in
the United States and remaining in the United States following the
completion of their graduate trainings [sic]. 4
While IMG physicians have no real power to influence congressional
members, it is unlikely that Congress will completely stop the influx of
JMGs. This is because a large majority of IMG physicians complete their
residency programs in hospitals serving under-privileged patient
populations and upon completion of their training, most practice medicine

"Inglehart, supra note 1, at 1680.
'AId.
3
'51d.

5Id.

37Id.

381d.
3"Inglehart, supra note 1, at 1680.
4
'The Importanceofthe MedicaidPrograniin SupportingAcademic Medicine (July 1995)
(Testimony delivered on behalf of the Association of American Medical Colleges before the
Senate Finance Committee). See also, Inglehart, supra note I, at 1680.
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with poor and under-privileged patient populations. 41 As long as United
States medical school graduates are reluctant to practice and seek
residency positions in under-privileged areas, the influx of IMGs will
likely continue in at least reduced numbers. It is clear to some federal and
state policy makers that for patients in rural areas, there will be a longer
wait to see a physician and fewer services if IMGs are prevented from
entering and practicing in this country.42
In addition to governmental efforts, several influential national
organizations and their spokespersons have started fierce campaigns
against IMGs. These groups have included the Pew Health Professions
Commission, the Council on Graduate Medical Education, the
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, the Physician
Payment Review Commission, the Macy Foundation, and the Institute of
Medicine. 43 Probably the best known and most widely discussed of the
reports are those of the twenty-one member bipartisan Pew Commission.
Its latest report, issued in December 1995, made several recommendations
including limiting the number of the residency slots and tightening visa
restrictions for IMGs.44
In another example, a recent report by a committee from the Institute
of Medicine, co-chaired by Dr. Neal A. Vanselow, former chancellor at
Tulane University Medical Center, openly blames the oversupply of
physicians in the United States on IMGs. 45 According to Dr. Vanselow,
the "physician glut" is the result of increasing numbers of IMGs entering
residency training in the United States.46 Furthermore, Dr. Vanselow
claims the influx of IMGs "decreases the opportunity for talented young
persons from this country to enter the medical profession."47 At a
subsequent television interview, Dr. Vanselow opposed the use of
Medicare funds to support the training of IMGs.48
41Scott, supra note 11.
42
A statement made by James Merritt, president of Merritt, Hawkins & Associates, the

largest medical recruiting firm in the U.S. Mr. Merritt's firm is responsible for 1,200 medical
recruitment
searches every year, about 30% of them abroad.
4
'Dr. Spencer Foreman., Graduate Medical Education, Medicare Financing, Congressional
Testimony, June 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10164908.
"Inglehart,
supra note 1, at 1681.
4

SId.

46Congressional Testimony, Apr. 16, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 7138088.
47

1d.

4Id. See also, Institute of Medicine, The Nation's Physician Workforce Optionsfor
BalancingSupply Requirements,Washington, DC: National Academy Press (1996).
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Post Residency I1G Physicians
Approximately seventy-five percent of IMGs who finish their residency
programs will establish medical practices in the United States.4 ' The
majority of 1MG physicians complete their residencies in hospitals serving
poorpeople, and upon completion oftheir training, most practice medicine
with poor and under privileged patient populations."' Throughout the
years, rural areas and poor urban areas have relied heavily on foreign
medical personnel.5
Overall, IMG physicians are less successful in obtaining medical
board certification than their United States and Canadian-educated
counterparts.52 Although the cause of this discrepancy is not fully
explained, various reasons include several non-discriminatory factors such
as inferior medical school training, individual differences in ability, and
lack of proficiency in the English language."
Generally, IMGs are an easy target for politicians and legislators
because they lack influence in physicians' organizations, despite their
substantial numbers5 4 They are unorganized and do not have a voice in
major medical associations such as the American Medical Association
(AMA). For example, despite their large size, until recently IMGs did not
have their own chapter within the AMA. 5s As a result, they are being
openly blamed and targeted by many organizations and agencies
for the
6
oversupply of physicians and specialists in the United States.
Considering the significant increase in the number of IMGs in recent
years and the growth of managed care organizations, with their emphasis
on reduced inpatient treatment and preventive programs, one would expect
anti-IMG sentiment to increase further. This, therefore, would cause
hardships and displacement to many IMGs, including those who have been
practicing in this country for many years. Nevertheless, most ofthe IMGs

4

Mullan, supra note 6, at 1524.

sold.

S'Stein, supra note 8.
' 2John J.Smith, Specialty Board Certificationand Fcdcral Civil Rights Statutes. 11 J.
CoNTNiP. HEALTH L. & POLY 111 (1994).
Id.
USee Inglehart, supra note 1, at 1680; Whitcomb, supra note 2, at 455.
ssSharon Mcllrath, EducatorsFaceLikely FinancialCuts But Want to Call 0"n Shots, 39
AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 23, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 11860591.
55
Whitcomb, supra note 2, at 455.
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will probably survive the hardship if they continue to serve the
underserved areas that most managed care organizations avoid.
MANAGED HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM
Background
With the exception of hospital-based physicians, the medical profession
has always enjoyed operating on a fee-for-service basis.5 7 Under this
system of payment, physicians received compensation for every office
visit and for every procedure, thus creating a substantial financial
incentive for physicians to increase the provision of health services.58
While in an adequately functioning market, consumers could defuse
physicians' inflationary incentives by purchasing health services only
when the benefits of a particular procedure or prescription outweigh its
costs, this general economic theory has not worked because of inherent
imperfections in the health care market. Without going into detail, the
major reasons for this imperfection are thought to be the imbalance of
information between health care providers, consumers and the third party
payor system (i.e. health insurance). 59 In the past, while the third party
payor had an incentive to keep the cost down, they were unable to correct
the problem mainly because they were unable to monitor health care
providers closely and thus could not question their professional judgments.
As a result, they passed the increased costs to the consumers. 6 In the last
decade a major move has been made toward managed health care delivery
systems because of the inherent problems with the fee-for-service
61
market.
"Managed care" is broadly defined as any effort to monitor and
control health care utilization and cost by various methods including
capitation, case management systems, utilization review, pre-admission
screening, and the requirement of second opinions. 62 Today, over 1,500

S"Whitcomb, supra note 2, at 455.
58
1d.
5
James P. Freiburg, The ABCs ofMCOs: An Overview of Managed Care Organizations,
81 ILL. B.J. 584, 585 (1993).
0
d. at 584-85.
61
62M.d

NHLA, The InsiderGuide to ManagedCare: A Legal andOperationalRoadmnap(1990);
10 HEALTH AFF. 4 (1991).
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Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) cover an estimated 100
million Americans. 63
There are many different forms of Managed Care Organizations

(MCO) in operation.'

The three-way relationship among the MCOs,

providers and enrollees varies substantially by the type and structure of the
MCO. For the purpose of analyzing obligations and liabilities in this

three-way relationship, the actual structure of MCOs may become a very
important factor. Some MCOs may exercise close control over their
health care providers, thus creating an employer-employee type
relationship. On the other extreme, some open panel MCOs may have no
control over the providers and just simply pay the monthly capitated

payments on behalf of their enrollees.
Because of such extreme variations among MCOs, one must be very

careful when analyzing the MCO's obligations, liabilities and relationship
with the providers. 65 Nevertheless, MCOs, as business and health care
entities, are subject to both federal and state regulations and courts

'Due to the dynamic and volatile nature of the current health care system in the United
States, the statistics on MCOs change almost daily. The following facts about MCO3 are taken
from the Internet as Sidebar 4. The document was created from RTF source version 2.7.5. Other
Managed Care Facts include:
Number of HIIOs in the United States - 574
Number of PPOs in the United States - 1036
Number of Americans in HMOs- 51 Million
Number of Americans in PPOs- 50.2 Million
Number of Americans in All Managed Care Plans - 100 Million
Percentage of Insured Employees in Managed Care Health Plans - 66%
(Working in Finns with at Least 10 Employees)
Percentage of Medicare Enrollees in HMOs - 9%
Percentage of Medicaid Enrollees in HMOs - 11.8 %
Percentage of Mlfs with at Least One Managed Care Contact- 75%
Percentage of MDs with at Least One HMO Contract - 48%
Percentage of HMOs That Are For-profit-- 69%
Percentage of HMOs That Are Not-for-profit - 31%
Percentage of HMO Members in For-profit Plans - 57.8%
Percentage of HMO Members in Not-for-profit Plans - 42.2%
Percentage of HMOs That Offer Nutrition Courses - 87%
Percentage of HMOs That Offer Smoking Cessation Courses - 67.3%
Percentage of HMOs with Lists of Approved Prescription Drugs - 100%
Salary of CEO of U.S. Healthcare, a For-profit HMO - S3.9 Million
Percentage of HMOFunds Spent on Health by U.S. Health Care - 73%
e'Jon Gabel, Ten Was HMOs Have ChangedDuring 1990s, 16 HEALTH AFF. 134, 135
(1997).65
YOUNGER, LEGAL ANSWER BOOK FOR MANAGED CARE (1995).
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generally use the "businessjudgment rule" 66 when
adjudicating contractual
67
disputes with provider physicians and MCOs.
Generally speaking, the non-staff MCO's relationship with its
providers can be based on "closed panel" contracts inwhich physicians
serve its enrollees exclusively. 8 Conversely, in an "open panel" contract,
physicians are free to sign up with as many MCOs as they wish, and may
agree to a fee-for-service or capitated payment contract.6 9 There are four
major types of MCOs.70 The first, the staff model, is a closed panel plan
setup with participating physicians as salaried staffmembers who provide
health care to the MCO enrollees primarily in their own facilities. 71 The
second type, the group model, could be either a closed or open panel.72 In
this model, an MCO contracts with independent multi specialty group
practices that serve patients in MCO facilities or in their own offices.7"
Dependent on the level of control exercised by the MCO, the physicians
may be considered employees or contractors.74 The third type, Individual
Practice Associations (IPA), are open panel MCOs that contract with
individual physicians or specialty group practices to serve MCO enrollees
but are free to care for their own private patients. 7' Today, this is the
dominant form of MCO and represents over fifty percent of all existing
MCOs in the market.76 Finally, the network model is an open panel plan
in which an MCO contracts with two or more group practices.77 These
group practices may provide fee-for-service medical care for non-MCO
members while maintaining separate contracts with one or more MCOs at
the same time.78

"Bryan A. Liang, Deselection UnderHarperv. Healthsource:A Blow for Maintaining
Patient-PhysicianRelationshipsin the EraofManaged Care?, 72NOTRE DAME L. REv. 799,849

(1997).

6Id.

63Id.
69Id
7
"Earlene P. Weiner, Managed Health Care: HMO Corporate Liability, Independent
Contractors,
and the OstensibleAgency Doctrine, 15 J. CORP. L. 535, 54041 (1990).
71

' d. at 540.

72

1d. at 541.
at 540.

73
741d.
1d.
7

SWeiner, supra note 70, at 540-41.

7Id.

77Id. at 541.

78Id. at 540.
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There are also other types of loosely structured provider network
organizations including the Preferred Provider Organization (PPO),
Management Services Organization (MSO), Physician Hospital
Organization (PHO), and other creative combinations or variations of
these structures.
Under managed care health care delivery systems, the financial
incentives to health care providers are often reversed from the customary
fee-for-service system. In a managed care setting, groups of consumers
(or government) that contract with an MCO make an annual (or monthly)
payment to cover the health care needs oftheir members for the entire year
(month).79 In exchange, the MCO agrees to handle all the health needs of
the plan's members, regardless of the costs associated with members'
treatment."0 The annual profit retained by the managed care group consists
of the difference between the annual payment and the total cost of
providing health care for the year.8 Thus, in contrast to the inflationary
pressures facing providers in a fee-for-service environment, MCOs have
a profound structural incentive to limit the costs of health care delivered
to its members."
At the same time, the managed care insurers hold physicians
accountable in several ways: through oversight controls, financial
incentives, and/or punishment though termination or deselection' 3 They
use massive databases when evaluating whether to pay and how to pay
providers. s4 Most develop profiles on each physician's practice and
compare it to his or her peers or to national standards.85 As allowed in
their contract, nearly all MCOs and PPOs can terminate or deselect
physicians with or without any explanation. 6 When a physician is
terminated by an MCO for just cause it has an obligation to report the
incidence to the National Practitioner's Databank. 7 However, in the

79

1d. at 540.

Weiner, supra note 70, at 540.
"Note, The Impact ofManaged Careon Doctors Wh7jo Serve Poor andMinority Patients,
108 HARV. L. REv 1625, 1627 (1995).
82Id.
3Id.

'4Id.
Id.
"Liang, supra note 66, at 849.

81d.
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majority of cases, to avoid complications that may arise from such
reporting, the MCO simply terminates the contract without cause.8"
Selection and Deselection of Physicians
by Managed Care Organizations
As business entities, MCOs are organized to minimize costs and maximize
income through whatever means legally possible. 9 When an MCO enters
into a market, it attempts to secure or select the services of as many

providers (e.g., physicians, hospitals) as possible so they may offer
potential customers (e.g., employers, government) a desirable product.90

Typically, this results in a comprehensive network of physicians,
hospitals, and other health care sources covering a large geographic area.91
However, once the MCO has determined and assessed its market needs,

it adjusts its providers in order to minimize the costs associated with
keeping a provider in the plan.92 This goal is achieved simply by

deselecting93 the unwanted physicians or just by refusing to sign a new

contract once the original contract has expired.9 4 While there is no

concrete study on the subject, it is believed that the vast majority of
terminations and deselections occur because of economic conditions
unrelated to quality of care.9" Obviously, deselection affects both the
physicians and hospitals, but since the physicians are more likely than

88Id.
"As business entities, managed care plans act to obtain market share through other means.
For example, in addition to minimizing costs, to obtain access to markets as indicated infra notes
6-8, and accompanying text, managed care plans may sign up physicians and then deselect them
after securing their patients in the plan. Jim Montague, Joiningthe Race: State Medical Societies
Tryto BeatManagedCareIntegratorsto thePunch,Hosps. &HEALTHNETWORKS, Sept. 5, 1994,
at 50; Jim Montague, Striking Back: Managed Care Plans Are Dumping Physicians,But the
DoctorsAre FightingBack, Hosps. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Oct. 20, 1994, at 38.
9
Montague, supra note 89, at 50.
9'Id. at 60.
92Ken Terry, When Health PlansDon't Want You Anymore, MED. ECON., May 23, 1994,
at 138. In order for an MCO to receive accreditation, it must file various quality and health
outcome reports that require inspection of providers' facilities and audit of medical records with
expenses paid by MCOs. Therefore, ifaprovider does not have enough enrollment from an MCO,
it would probably more cost effective for the MCO to terminate the contract and requesting their
enrollee to select another member provider to switch to another MCO. Id.
"3 Id. Deselection is that process where providers have their contracts with MCOs
terminated under the termination without cause clauses of their contracts.

94Id.
9
5Id.
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hospitals to be deselected, it has a greater impact on physicians.9 In most
cases, an MCO could terminate or deselect a physician without any fear
of reprisal because the contract usually includes a "without cause'
termination clause. There are also several quality 93 and patient care
related clauses in the contract that allow an MCO to terminate a physician
for an agreed "just cause."
In many open panel MCOs, the relationship between a physician and
anMCO is based upon a uniform and carefully drafted contract rather than
a traditional at will employment relationship. 9 Therefore, deselection and
termination work through contract principles. Physicians who enter into
agreements to serve as providers for MCOs must generally accept the
standard "termination without cause" clauses, which allow either party to
terminate the contract with some specified time of notice for any or no
reason at all."'0 While these clauses were initially demanded by the
physicians, they now put all the power in the hands of the MCOs because
it is less likely the physicians, especially IMGs, in the current health care
climate would terminate their contract with an MCO. °" In fact, of the
many physicians who have been deselected or terminated, only a few were
successful in bringing actions against MCOs."' 2 This is because of the
existence of an explicit "no cause termination clause" in the contract that
allows both MCOs and contracting physicians to freely cancel their
contracts at will."0 3 In the few existing successful cases, the challenges
were mostly for the lack of due process before termination rather than the
right to termination or deselection itself.1 04 The various theories under
which an MCO's
actions may be illegal will be discussed later in this
10 5
Comment.

9

6See Termination Clauses as Managed CarePenetrationBuilds, MANAGED CArts Wr-,
Dec. 11, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 12838181.
97Id.
93

Id. Physician can be terminated if his or her hospital privileges have been revoked,

suspended or terminated.
9Id.
See Howard Larkin, You're Fired;PhysicianTermination, 13 A. MED. NEW 17 (19 95).

Nearly all HiMOs and PPOs can abruptly fire, or 'deselect,' physicians vithout explanation.
01
1d.
'"Liang, supra note 66, at 805.
'lald
104
1d.
'0Ssee infra pp. 508-37.
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Physician Monitoring by Managed
Care Organizations
The impetus for an MCO to evaluate and monitor the practice of
physicians will depend on the type of MCO and on whether the MCO
acquires the patients of the physicians it hires." 6 In cases such as network
model MCOs and IPA model MCOs, in which the MCO often acquires
patients along with their physicians, the MCO will be discouraged from
selecting physicians with poor and high risk patients because of the
patients' inferior health status. In MCOs such as staff model MCOs, the
patients normally do not follow the physicians into the MCO. While these
MCOs may have fewer reasons to exclude physicians with low income
patient enrollees, nevertheless they do not welcome physicians with poor
10 7
patients because of the costlier treatment practices of such physicians.
Managed Care and IMG Physicians
Dislike of IMGs by some MCOs is due to several different factors. First,
discrimination and discriminatory acts in this society have not been
completely eradicated, and since most IMGs are foreign born, speak with
accents and have foreign complexions, they are easy targets for
discrimination.0 8 Second, IMG physicians tend to serve higher
percentages of lower socio-economic patients known to have higher
medical risks, and thus, are more costly to MCOs. 10 9 Therefore, in an
MCO environment, IMG physicians do not fare well. When making
decisions regarding the selection or deselection of physicians, MCOs
value cost-effectiveness in addition to medical quality."0 They take into
account whenphysicians perform fewerprocedures, order a lower number
of prescriptions and minimize referrals."' Physicians such as IMGs who
mostly serve poor and under- privileged communities are faced with a
higher percentage of sick patients who necessarily demand more intense
and costly medical care compared to a healthier group ofpatients. These
physicians, no matter how skilled and diligent, will appear to be less
2
attractive to MCOs as a result of the needs of the population they serve."1
'°Liang,
supra note 66, at 805.
'07Id.
103Id

11Old.
1'Id.
" 2Liang, supra note 66, at 805.

1999]

DISCRJMINATION OFINTERNA TIONAL PHYSICIANS

479

Therefore, it is natural MCOs do not value physicians such as IMIGs, who
treat poor and minority communities, as highly as physicians who serve
more affluent communities, thus causing an obvious detriment to IMG
physicians.
While the treatment of IMGs varies substantially by type of MCO,
staff-type MCOs such as Kaiser Permanente groups and hospital based
MCOs are more likely to hire IMGs as staffphysicians because IGs are
more likely to accept lower pay than non-IMG physicians." 3 Ontheother
hand, open panel MCOs are less
likely to select IMG physicians because
14
of the reasons stated above."

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST IMG PHYSICIANS
Discriminatory Intent
America has a long history of discrimination against 1MG physicians."'
1MG physicians have continuously encountered obstacles at nearly every
stage of their residency programs, board exams, in the job market and
securing hospital privileges." 6
However, the consequences of
discrimination have the potential to be far greater under managed care as
compared to a fee-for-service system. Under managed care, the market
power to discriminate against IMG physicians will be effectively
concentrated in the hands of the MCO executives responsible for
recruiting physicians. As the market becomes more efficient under the
managed care system, the number of physicians seeking to join a plan is
likely to increase. 7 This undoubtedly will create an environment ripe for
discrimination. Indeed, some IMG physicians already feel MCOs are
discriminating against them, or will discriminate against them, on the basis
of race or county of origin when selecting physicians with vhom to
contract." 8 In the survey of 1500 1MG physicians practicing in Ohio, over

13Id.
14Id.
1

l sKaren McBeth Chopra,A ForgottenMinority, AnAnerican Perspcctive' Historicaland
CurrentDiscriminationAgainstAsiansfronz the IndianSubcontincnt, 1995 DE'. C.L. REV. 1269,

1308 (1995).
116Id.
"7Mark A. Hall, Managed Care Competition andIntcgratcdDelivery Systcnis, 29 WAU>

FoEsT L. REv. 1,4-5 (1994).

"'Unpublished survey conducted by the author.
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seventy percent of the respondents predicted that IMGs will face harder
times in the future." 9
The potential for bias in the selection process is heightened by the
subjective criteria MCOs employ in their selection process.'
In the
absence of clear, objective criteria to judge quality, the subjective notion
of a physician's reputation could create an environment resulting in biased
judgment. In this setting, the MCOs that choose providers may be easily
influenced by the discriminatory forces in the medical market, thus
limiting the opportunities for IMG physicians.
In response to claims of discrimination under managed care, some
market analysts might argue that discrimination against 1MG physicians
would actually decrease as the nation moves more toward managed care
settings.
Such an argument might contend, for instance, that the
transformation ofthe medical industry to managed care would improve the
efficiency of the market for medical services, and thus, drive out
inefficient discriminatory behavior on the part ofMCOs. ' Theoretically,
the restructuring of the health industry to managed care would help
stimulate consumer groups by empowering them to exercise their
collective power to audit the activities of health care providers. 2
According to one theory, an MCO that unfairly deselects or refuses to
select IMG physicians because of their educational background will
eventually face greater costs than its more efficient, non-discriminatory
competitors. 2 4 The result, according to efficient-market advocates, would
be a trim health care industry in which only efficient providers would
survive."'
For several reasons, however, this view of managed care might not
be accurate for 1MG physicians. First, it is unclear ifcompetitive markets
eradicate discrimination since prejudicial practices often persist within
efficient markets. 26 Also, as the market power of MCOs increases and

9
11
201d.

1 Hall, supra note 117, at 5.
2
1 1id.

12Id.

"Alain C. Enthoven, The History andPriciplesof Managed Care Competition, HEALTH
AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24-25. See also, ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MANAGED
CARE COMPETITION
IN HEALTH CARE 34-35 (1988).
24

1 Id.
'12sd.
'26id.
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MCOs consolidate themselves, the incidence of discrimination by MCOs
against IMG physicians is likely to increase.27 Second, if a sufficiently
large number of MCOs engage in discrimination, the market would be
unable to distinguish the MCOs that do discriminate from those that do
not.128 Third, because information about the quality of individual
physicians is difficult and costly to ascertain, generalizations encouraging
the use of "foreign medical education" as a proxy for quality or lack
thereof assume greater importance. 2 9 Fourth, under an efficiently run
MCO the need for physicians declines, which results in a market glut in
which a large number of physicians are seeking employment and
involvement with MCOs. Because of the foregoing arguments, it appears
that the discrimination against IMGs by MCOs has just started, and it is
foreseeable this discrimination will worsen as the health care market goes
through the current reform phase. Whether the situation for IMGs changes
for the better is dependent on many factors, including the situation of the
United States medical schools which themselves are going through major
changes and facing many budget cuts
due to the reduction in affiliated
30
hospital support and research funds.
The Consequences of Exclusion
IMG physicians constitute a twenty-three percent of all practicing
physicians in the United States.' 3 ' Exclusion of such a large force from
the American health care market could have grave consequences for the
health care system, especially for the quality of health care delivered to the
poor and minoritypatientpopulation LMGs serve. Therefore, ifamanaged
care organization excluded these physicians from its plan, it may find
itself left out of the health care industry altogether. Although the managed
care movement contemplates the elimination of some of the surplus of
American physicians, IMG physicians and physicians who serve poor and
minority communities should not be forced to bear a disproportionate
share of the burden. In addition, the consequences of excluding an unfair
number of IMG physicians would extend far beyond the burden imposed
upon the excluded providers.
27Id.

' 28Enthoven, supra note 123, at 25.
9
12
1301d.
1d.

13id.
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The inappropriate elimination of talented IMG physicians by MCOs
could decrease the quality of medicine practiced in managed care
settings." As explained above, the algorithms used by many MCOs to
assess physician practice styles are based on cost-effective decision
making which most often do not properly adjust for the health status of a
physician's patient population.' 33 These flawed selection methods may,
therefore, lead MCO executives to overlook skilled, efficient physicians
who serve poor and underprivileged communities which are more likely
to have members in poor health. Instead, they select less skilled, less
efficient doctors who serve a higher percentage of healthy patients and,
thus, incur lower costs. The natural and unfortunate result of such a biased
process would be a decline in the quality of care given to the poor and an
underserved patient population. 34 Inner-city patients would have
difficulty obtaining health care services even if they were able to enroll in
a pre-paid health plan. Those patients who do not subscribe to a managed
care plan would be inconvenienced because there would be fewer
3
providers in their city to treat them. 1
As the system of health care delivery moves toward greater
integration, more IMGs will probably find themselves out of MCO plans.
Such a scenario is likely where the Integrated Delivery System (IDS) is
initially structured as an open PHO, which subsequently reorganizes as a
closed PHO. 136 The "closed" system will allow only a select group of
physicians to become members, whereas, as discussed earlier, the open
system allows medical staff who are not owners or partners to provide
37
services.
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IMGS
Federal Government
Using its constitutional power over immigration, the federal government
can effectively limit or completely stop offering required visas to IMG

32

1 1d.

133See Miriam Komaromt, The Role ofBlack andHispanicPhysiciansin ProvidingHealth
Carefor
UnderservedPopulations, 334 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1305 (1996).
34
1 Id.

13Id
136Id
7
13
1d.
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physicians applying for residency programs in the United States.13S Also,
the federal government can make it difficult for IMGs to remain in the
United States once they have completed their residency program. 139 For
example, in the recent immigration bill President Clinton signed into law
on September 30, 1996, the issue of IMGs studying in the United States
on J-1 exchange visitor visas was addressed. 40 Under the new law, an
IMG holder of a J-1 exchange visa is required to remain on temporary H1B visas for a minimum of three years before applying for permanent
residency (i.e., green card). 41
The federal government is restrained from taking actions such as
naked discrimination against foreign-born IMG's who remain in the
country lawfully by virtue of the equal protection clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4 ' Under the equal
protection doctrine, governmental classifications on the basis of alienage,
race, or national ancestry or origin are inherently suspect. 43 To survive
a challenge under equal protection, the policies excluding lawful
practicing IMGs would have to advance a compelling governmental
interest and be narrowly tailored to effect that interest.' Although the
need to increase the number of primary care physicians and decrease the
number of specialists may be important, it is probably not compelling.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment protection may not be easily extended
to those United States-born physicians who received their medical degree
abroad, unless the challenger is a member of suspect class as stated
above. 145

State Government
Many states with a large rural or poor population are generally willing to
accommodate IMG physicians, as these physicians are willing to provide
medical care that United States medical school graduates are typically
'Congressional Testimony, availablein1996 WL10S30622, Sept. 12,1996. In fact, under
the U.S. Constitution Congress has plenary power over immigration issues. See Azizi v.
Thomburgh, 908 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1990).
'Congressional Testimony, availablein 1996 W\L10830622, Sept. 12, 1996.
14id.
14'28 AM. MED. NEWS 28, Dec. 9, 1996.
42
U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
14'Grahamv. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,376 (1971); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214,219-20 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
1
44Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1986).
5

141d.
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unwilling to provide. 146 In fact, during the recent congressional debates
on IMGs, states such as South Dakota, New Jersey and New York testified
in support of IMGs and offered their financial support to those willing to
study within their states and remain to practice medicine in designated
areas after completion of their study. 14 7 However, these states suggested
that the federal government provide conditional visas to these IMGs,
allowing their visas to remain valid as long as they are in that state and
offer medical care in a region selected by the state.148 Under this proposal,
states will request special waivers from the federal government for a
limited number of J-1 holders so that these IMGs can remain in the United
States after completing their residency programs and practice within the
sponsored state. 49 It appears that this is the prevailing policy regarding
at least some IMGs who enter this country under J-1 visas.
Once an 1MG physician receives permanent residency or becomes a
United States citizen, state governments are restrained from direct
discrimination against foreign-born IMGs because ofthe equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 To survive a challenge under
equal protection, the state policies excluding IMGs would have to advance
a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to effect that
interest. 5 '
PRIVATE ENTITY
Although private parties have a wide range of discretion in hiring and
firing their employees, these rights are generally limited by various federal
and state laws. In general, private entities such as MCOs are restrained
from taking primafaciediscriminatory action against IMGs because of
several protections available to IMGs by virtue of:
(1) state law (i.e., physician protection type statute),
(2) contract law,
(3) tort law,
1461d.
1471d.

1481d.

149 d. at 216-17.
'50See e.g., Plyler,457 U.S. at 216 (noting that the Equal Protection Clause "directs that 'all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike").

"'Id. at 216-17.
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(4) anti-discrimination laws (i.e. Title VII or section 1981) and
(5)

antitrust.

State's "Physician Protection" Statutes
The single most important law that may offer protection to all physicians,
including IMGs, when facing unjust termination or deselection by MCOs
is a "physician fairness act" statute which many states have already passed
or are considering at this time. 52 These acts are either a "stand alone"

statute or part of a more general "managed care fairness" statute.'

For

example, in the state of Ohio a provision in Senate Bill number 33,154

currently under consideration, 55 provides criteria for evaluating the
participation and practice of health care providers, prohibits termination
ofproviders for unjust causes and requires a hearing to explain the reasons
for termination. 6 Specifically, sections 3924.84(A) and 3924.85(A) of
the bill require an MCO, on request, to make available to a health care
provider copies of the application procedures and minimum qualification
'RId.
153

Id.

'"S.B. 33, as passed Senate Health Committee.
1-'S.B. 33, 122nd General Assembly, Mar. 1997.
See S.B. 33, as passed Senate Health Committee, § (C)(1) No Health Maintenance
Organization May Do Either of the Following Terminate the Participation of a Health Care
Professional or Health Care Facility as a Provider under an Individual or Group Health
Maintenance Organization Contract Solely forMaking Recommendations forInpatientorFollowup Care for a Particular Mastectomy Patient, That Are Consistent with the Care Required to Be
Covered by this Section;
(1) establish or Offer Monetary or Other Financial Incentives for the Purpose of
Encouraging a Person to Decline the Inpatient or Follow-up Care Required to Be
Covered by this Section.
§ (C)(1) No Sickness and Accident Insurer May Do Either of the Following:
(a) terminate the Participation of a Health Care Professional or Health Care Facility as a
Provider under a Sickness and Accident Insurance Policy Solely for Matng
Recommendations for Inpatient or Follow-up Care for a Particular Mastectomy
Patient, That Are Consistent with the Care Required to Be Covered by this Section;
§ (A) (1) No Managed Care Organization Shall Terminate a Contract or Employment ith a
Health Care Provider Unless the Organization Provides to the Health Care Provider
Written Notice by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, of the Reasons for the
Termination and an Opportunity for a Hearing ....
(b) the Notice Shall State the Reasons for the Proposed Termination and Include a
Statement That the Health Care Provider May, Within Thirty Days of Receiving the
Notice, Request a Hearing Before a Panel Described in this Section. The Request
Shall Be Made by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested. The Hearing Shall Be
Held Within Thirty Days after the Organization Receives a Request for Hearing from
the Provider.
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requirements a provider must meet to be employed by or enter into a
contract with the MCO.15 7 The MCO must consult with the health care
providers in developing the criteria.'58
Moreover, the MCO must annually notify each health care provider
it employs or contracts with of the information and criteria it uses to
evaluate the provider's practice. 59 The MCO must consult with health
care providers in establishing and maintaining methods to collect and
analyze information relating to the providers' practices."'
Any
information used to evaluate a provider's practice must be measured
against the criteria for evaluating providers' practices and against an
appropriate group of health care providers using similar treatments and
serving a comparable patient population. 6 ' Within fourteen days after
notifying a provider of the MCO's criteria for evaluating the provider's
practice, the MCO must give the provider an opportunity to discuss in
person the evaluation and to work with the MCO in improving his or her
practice."'
In section 3924.85(B), entitled Termination ofProvider Participation,
the bill prohibits an MCO from terminating a contract with or employment
of a health care provider unless the MCO provides written notice of the
reasons for termination and an opportunity for a hearing.'63 The bill
specifies this provision does not apply to cases that involve fraud,
imminent harm to a patient or final disciplinary action by a state licensing
board or any other authority that affects the provider's ability to
practice. 164 It also specifies that this provision does not affect the bill's
requirement that a transitional period of 6 coverage be provided to
beneficiaries when a provider is terminated. 1
The statute allows the provider to request a hearing within thirty days
of receiving the notice of termination before a panel comprised of at least
three individuals appointed by the MCO.16 6 Of the individuals appointed

's7See S.B. 33, as passed by Senate Health Committee, §§ 3924.84(a) and 3924.85(a).
15 8 d.

159
6 Md.

1 0Id.
161id.

..23See S.B. 33, as passed by Senate Health Committee, §§ 3924.84(a) and 3924.85(a).
161d "
164Id.
1651d.

166Id.
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to the panel, at least one must be a member of the same profession and the
same or a similar specialty as the health care provider under review. 67
The panel may consist of more than three individuals, but a least one-third
of the members must be of the same profession and the same or a similar
specialty as the provider under review. 6 '
When a hearing is requested, the statute requires it be held within
thirty days after the MCO receives the request. 69 The panel appointed by
the MCO must render a decision within fourteen days after the hearing is
conducted and notify the provider. 7 The decision maybe reinstatement
of the provider's MCO participation, reinstatement subject to conditions
established by the MCO, or termination.' Termination of a provider's
contract or employment cannot be effective earlier than thirty days after
the provider receives written notice of the panel's decision."
Section 3924.85(B)(4)) of the bill specifies its provisions regarding
notice and hearings for termination of a provider's participation with an
MCO do not prohibit or otherwise restrict either an MCO or a provider
from exercising the right not to renew a contract that expires.1
Nonrenewal on the part of an MCO, however, is subject to the notification
and hearing requirements for termination of a provider's participation.'74
The act also requires the party intending not to renew a contract, whether
the MCO or the provider, to provide written notice to the other party no
later than sixty days prior to the contract's expiration date."7 ' The notice
must be made by certified mail, return receipt requested. 7 6 If the contract
has no stated expiration date, the contract is considered to expire on the
first day of January after the contract has been in effect for one full year,
and annually thereafter.'"
It is clear if this bill becomes a law it provides some protection for
physicians who were terminated from a plan without just cause. It also
sets formal review procedures that will help in reducing confusion.
'67See
S.B. 33, as passed by Senate Health Committee, §§ 3924.84(a) and 3924.85(a).
163Id.
169

M.

701d.

1711d.
7

" See S.B. 33, as passed by Senate Health Committee,

§§ 3924.84(a) and 3924.85(a).

13Id.
174Id.

175Id.
176Id.

"'SeeS.B. 33, as passed by Senate Health Committee, §§ 3924.84(a) and 3924M5(a).
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Dependent on the courts' interpretation ofthis statute and what constitutes
"just cause" termination, this law may be the most promising protection
available for IMGs practicing in state of Ohio.
In the absence of "physician protection" statutes, some state courts
have relied upon state anti-discrimination acts to offer relief to discharged
physicians. For example, a California court inAmbrosino v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Companyl' 8 held the termination of a podiatrist as a
provider under his contract with the insurance company violated
California's anti-discrimination statute.'79 Termination of the provider
was found to be discriminatory under the state's civil rights statute. 180 The
court further stated that termination even under a "without cause" clause
on the basis of "race, creed, religion, color, national origin, sex, or
disability of the person" would violate the civil rights statute and thus be
prohibited.18 ' In this case the court held for the physician despite the
182
"termination without cause clause" within the contractual agreement.
The court stated that regardless of the clause, a party cannot discriminate
on the basis of prohibited criteria within civil rights statutes.' 83
Contract Law
The relationship between an MCO and physicians is almost exclusively
based on a well-written and well-documented contract. In staff model
MCOs, this contract is usually similar to any other employment contract.
The physician is an employee of the MCO, is subject to close control by
the MCO and receives regular salary and benefits. However, in the
majority ofphysician-MCO relationships, physicians serve as independent
contractors and a formal contract specifies the responsibilities and
obligations of each party that both sides agree to voluntarily.184 While the
degree of control may vary among MCOs, the details of the relationship
are basically controlled by the terms of contract. Therefore, contract law
will apply if one side does not honor the agreed-upon terms. In general,
however, the real disputes between the parties are not in the expressed

"'Ambrosino v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438, 440 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

79d. at 445.
'8 Id. at 444.

'8 Id. at 442-43 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998)).

"8231d. at 445.
1 1d.

"uFreiburg,supra note 59, at 585 (describing the different types of relationships between
physicians and health maintenance organizations).
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terms of the contract, but in those unwritten implied elements of the
contracts. The following section discusses several contract theories that
may be raised in the physician-MCO relationship. Note, this discussion
is not restricted to only IMG physicians, but can also be applied to all
physician-MCO contracts.
Employer Policies
Formal MCO policies may be enforceable under traditional contract
analysis. When an MCO circulates a manual describing procedures for
physician selection and deselection, it may constitute enforceable promises
which could create reasonable expectations on the part of interested
physicians.'s
Generally, a managed care organization has its own internal bylaws
and regulations used in dealing with outsiders such as enrollees, hospitals
and physicians. 8 6 The MCOs usually have detailed policies and bylaws7
regarding the criteria for selection and deselection of their physicians.8
Obviously, these bylaws can be used in favor of as well as against MCOs
when deciding to select or deselect their providers. A clear violation of
these bylaws by an MCO could be considered a violation of either an
express or implied contract.
This result is usually reached by applying unilateral contract theory;
that is, viewing a policy manual or MCO handbook as an offer by the
MCO. However, there are several problems with these types of claims.
First, some states do not recognize it as an actionable claimY 3 Second, it
is mainly applied to master-servant (employer-employee) type
relationships, covering mostly staff or certain types of close panel MCOs.
Third, a clear and conspicuous disclaimer in the handbooks and manuals
can easily defeat the unilateral contract theory, especially for initial
selection challenges, as long as it does not violate federal or state law."
On the other hand while clear disclaimers in MCOs' bylaws, handbooks
or manuals could provide significant protection to MCOs, they may not,
however, provide a fool proof defense. Some courts may still find that

's'Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 194); Southwest
Gas Corp. v. Alroad, 668 P.2d 261,295 (Nev. 1983).
lSSLeilvold, 688 P.2d at 172.
187Id.

.. SFreiburg, supra note

189Id.

59, at 584.
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contractual obligations exist, despite the presence of express disclaimers
in the contract.' 9
In addition to bylaws, almost all MCOs have their own quality or
utilization criteria to which physicians must comply.' 9' Under their
express contractual agreement, an MCO may terminate its relationship
with a physician provider if the physician acts in a manner which is
materially injurious or detrimental to patients (or, in some settings, to the
specialty network), or loses hospital privileges involuntarily or for other
reasons stated in the contract. 192 Usually, this is a complex contract form,
and an MCO may take advantage of its complexity and terminate an IMG
unjustly. While the affected IMG may challenge termination (or
deselection) through internal grievance procedures which are normally
available in all MCO contracts, it would be difficult for an IMG to prevail.
This is because of the complexity of the contracts, and that most of these
are form contracts drafted by MCOs.9 3 Nevertheless, a clear violation of
the contract by an MCO could be used against it in any court proceeding.
In reality, however, these contracts are drafted so heavily in favor of
MCOs that it would be a difficult task to find any blatant violations.
Promissory Estoppel
Another method of contractual analysis ofthe employment relationship is
promissory estoppel, found in Section 90(1) of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts: "A promise which the promissor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promise or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding
if injustice
94
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."'
While utilizing promissory estoppel to bind an employer to perform
promises for benefits such as pensions has been used in the past, the use
of promissory estoppel to enforce promises for job security is a new

" Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1476 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that disclaimer did
not warrant summary judgment for the company because it must be read in terms of the parties'
expectations, which could have been affected because parts of the manual were phrased in
mandatory language).
'91Freiburg, supra note 59, at 584.
19Id.
'93d.
'94RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 90(l) (1981).
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phenomena. 195 The main problem with promissory estoppel is that
employees must rely on a promise. The more difficult issue becomes
determining what, if anything, the employer promised. In order for
promissory estoppel to provide any greater rights in this situation, the
court must find an implied promise to employ a physician permanently,
during good performance or at least for a reasonable period. 6 Therefore,
in practice the promissory estoppel theory may not offer any significant
protections to non-staff IMG physicians.
Good Faith and Public Policy
A third "contract" theory of enforcement of an IMGs' rights can be based
on implied covenant of good faith. 197 Although this theory shares some
characteristics of tort law because the duty is imposed by law and is nondisclaimable, good faith has achieved general acceptance in contract
law.198 As with all such principles, the duty of good faith is easier to
approve than to define.'99
The good faith principle applies when one party performs an act that
is not expressly barred by the contract in question, but is contrary to the
reasonable expectations of the other party.2°O In the employment context,
the classic case is Fortune v. National Cash Register,-'9 in which the
plaintiff claimed that he was discharged the day after securing for his
employer a $5 million contract that would have yielded him substantial
commissions under the compensation system in effect.2 ' The court found
the employment relationship contained an implied covenant of good faith

9

ISin Grouse v Group Health Plan, Ina, 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981), a pharm-1cist

resigned one job and turned dov.'n another in reliance on the promise of employment from the
defendant
The court invoked promissory estoppel to award the plaintiff his reliance interest Id,
1
6Id.
See generally,Note,ProtectingAlWill Employees Against IWrongtuIDischarge:The Dutj,

9

to Terminate Only in Good Faith,93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980) (proposing "a comprehensive
economic rationale for judicial revision of common-law rules to provide at will employees vith
an expanded private remedy for wrongful discharge").
s'1d.

" See Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that
"good faith" lacks general meaning of its own unless applied to a particualr context").
""Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373,389-90 (Cal. 1988).
"'Fortune v. National Cash Register, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
2
70Id. at 1253-54.
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that prevented the employer from
firing an employee merely to deprive
20 3
him of the fruits of his labors.
Also, in the first victory by a physician for termination without just
cause by an MCO, the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied the bad
faith and public policy principal in reaching its decision.20 4 In Harperv.
Healthsource,20 5 the court held if a physician's relationship is terminated
without cause and the physician believes the decision to terminate was, in
truth, made in bad faith or based upon some factor that would render the
decision contrary to public policy, then the physician is entitled to a
review of the decision.20 6 This is the first ruling of its kind and will
undoubtedly offer some legal ammunition to disgruntled physicians,
including IMGs, in other states.
However, the main problem with the good faith rule is that courts
have applied it in varying degrees. In the broadest extension, the good
faith principle requires an employer to show good cause for discharging
an employee. In narrower formulations, the good faith theory is viewed
as simply excluding certain reasons as legitimate bases for the employer's
conduct, while leaving large areas to the employer's discretion.20 7 In
short, a "good faith" claim could be a valid cause of action but its success
depends on the specific circumstances and generally is unpredictable.
TORT CLAIMS
In addition to the contract law discussed above, several tort laws such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with
contractual relations, deceit, defamation and invasion ofprivacy may offer

203

1d. at 1257. See also, Wakefield v. Northern Telecom., Inc., 769 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir.

1985) (explaining that the plaintiff could recover on the good faith theory if the defendant's
"desire to avoid paying him common was a substantial motivating factor in the decision to
discharge"); Tymshare, 727 F.2d at 1153 (inquiring whether it was reasonably understood that the

"powerto adjust quotas could not be employed"). Cf., Willisv. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d
62, 624 (Wash. 1988) (disagreeing that "in every employment contract there is an implied
covenant
2 of good faith").

°Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 965 (N.H. 1996).
Sd.
2
° Id. at 966.
2°TSee, e.g., ARCO Alaska v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1158 (Alaska 1988) (proving that
20

employee was discharged for personal animosity and not for work-related reasons sufficient for
duty of good faith suit).
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some remedy to disgruntled IMGs. The following section addresses these
theories in some detail.
Intentional Inffiction of Emotional Distress
Intentional infliction of emotional or mental distress2 0-3 claims may be
made if the MCO's conduct was outrageous. A comment in the
Restatement notes, "liability has been found only where the conduct has
been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized society." 209 An important factor in judging the
outrageousness of the conduct is whether the defendant (i.e. MCO) is
abusing a position of power over the plaintiff (i.e. IMG).21
In the
employment setting, the landmark case is Agis v. HowardJohnson Co."1 '
In Agis the employer dealt with theft in a restaurant by announcing that
waitresses would be discharged in alphabetical order until the person
responsible for the theft was discovered.
Plaintiff was first on the list
and thus, was fired even though defendant had no reason to suspect she
was the thief.213 The court recognized a cause of action for outrage.2 14 An

intentional infliction of emotional harm claim is more likely to be
applicable in a case of deselection when an IMG physician is discharged
by an MCO in a manner where the conduct of the MCO was extremely
outrageous, beyond the boundary of decency or utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.

... RRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 46 (1965).

'Id. at cmt. d.

21

°Id. at cmt. e.
N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976); see also Contreras v. Crowm Zellerbach Corp,, 565 P,2d

211355

1173,1176-77 (Vash. 1977) (utilizing this tort by victims for racist slurs); Tandy Corp. v. Bone,
678 S.YV.2d 312, 314-16 (Ark. 1984) (utilizing this tort by workers interrogated as to suppaz.ed
misconduct); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300,304-05 (5th Cir. 1989) (utilizng this
tort by aworker who was framed by a supervisor who placed checks in her purse to make it appaar
as if she were a thief). See generally,Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Morker Resistance,and
the Tort ofIntentionalInfliction ofEnotionalDistress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1983).
MAgis, 355 N.E.2d at 317.
213
id.
Id.

2 14
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Fraud
Another potentially applicable tort action in cases of deselection is
fraud.21 5 A good example of fraud in the employment setting is Bondi v.
Jewels, 216 in which the plaintiff was induced to close his shop and go to
work for a competitor. 27 He was found to have stated a cause of action of
fraud against his new employer when he was discharged from his "at will"
job after only two weeks. 1 8 Proving fraudulent misrepresentation,
however, is quite difficult. An IMG must show the defendant MCO knew
when it made its representations that they would not be carried out. 19
Further, not only must detrimental reliance be established, but also the
reliance must be shown to be reasonable. 22 0 Therefore, the fraud theory
may apply if an IMG can show the defendant MCO has committed fraud
during their selection or deselection process.
Defamation
A cause of action for defamation arises when statements are made in
writing (libel) or orally (slander) tending "to harm the reputation of
another so as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him. '22 1 The elements of
a defamation action are:
(1) a defamatory statement,
(2) made about the plaintiff,
(3) published to a third party.222

21

1RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1965).
2 6

" Bondi v. Jewels by Edwar, Ltd., 73 Cal. Rptr. 494,494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).

2 17

1d.

218

1d

219 "

See Shebar v. Sanyo Business Sys., 526 A.2d 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987),
aff'd, 544 A.2d 377 (N.J. 1988) (intent not to perform promise of lifetime employment to
employee made in order to keep him from going to a competitor was established by testimony of
executive recruiterthat Sanyo sought areplacement for plaintiffimmediately after the promise was
made).
20
See, e.g., Shelby v. Zayre Corp., 474 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Ala. 1985) (reliance on promise
of permanent employment unreasonable in face of signed application form that employment was
at will).
2'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
mid.
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Defamatory statements often occur in the employment context. Words
that impute a physician with fraud, dishonesty, misconduct, incapacity, or
'unfitness are defamatory. The test is how the words would be understood
using the "reasonable person standard."' m Given the breadth of the
concept of defamation, one commentator has noted, "Any discharge for
cause, negative evaluation, or unfavorable reference ofa former employee
gives rise to a potential cause of action for defamation,
whether or not an
' 4
harm."2
economic
actual
employee has sustained
In most jurisdictions, the publication requirement can be satisfied
even when the defamatory communication remains within the employer's
organizationYm However, truth is an absolute defense for a defamation
claim, and only the "gist" or "sting" of the statement need be true.2
Intentional Interference with Contract
Tort law also protects parties in a contract from intentional interference
with their relationship by third parties. 7 This tort applies to employment
contracts, including at-will employment." Intentional interference with
a contract requires:
(1) the existence of a contract between an employer and an
employee;
(2) knowledge of that relationship by the third party;
(3) interference with that relationship by, for example, seelding
the employee's discharge;
(4) lack of justification; and

'2 See, e.g., Falls v. SportingNews Publishing Co., S34F.2d611 (6thCir. 1987). The court

found a defamation claim stated when, in response to a reader's inquiries about a new'spap.r's
decision to discontinue plaintiff's column, one editor vrote: "Iknow Joe brightened a lot ofheartwith his column through the years but we felt it was time to make a change, with more energetic
columnists who attend more events and are closer to today's sports scene." Id. at 614.
" 4 Freeman, Employee Discharge:Defamation Through the Form of Termination, 39 N.
Y.U. CoNF. on LABOR § 17.01, at 634 (1986).
mSee, e.g., Stukuls v. State, 366 N.E.2d 829 (N.Y. 1977); RESTATF.ME"T (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 577 cmt. e (1977).

MId.
"See generally, Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic
Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI.L. REV. 61 (1921); Dan B.
Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contract Relations, 34 ARK, L. REV. 335 (1920);
RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766-767 (1979).

'See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Anz. 19S5).
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(5) proximately caused damages.229
A conceptual problem with applying this tort in a typical discharge
situation is that there must be someone who counts as a third party to the
contract who can be charged with interference.
In an INMG-MCO relationship, an IMG may bring an intentional
interference with contract lawsuit against a defendant MCO if it had
tortiously interfered with his contract with another MCO.
Privacy
Another possible tort action available for IMGs is "privacy." Tort law
recognizes a legally protected interest in privacy in four basic situations:
(1) intrusion on seclusion,
(2) appropriation of name or likeness,
(3) publicity given to private life, and
(4)

publicity placing a person in a false light.13 '

While all four varieties may arise in employment situations, perhaps the
most likely application of the tort is intrusion on seclusion. For example,
public disclosure of the contents of a personnel file of an IMG might give
rise to a privacy action when publicity is given to the private life of a
person even if it does not put the person in a false light.
The Public Policy Exception
The most important recent addition to the tort causes of action which may
be applicable to the IMG-MCO relationship is the "public policy
exception" to the at-will employment doctrine. The public policy
exception may limit an MCO's power to discharge an IMG when he has
engaged in conduct protected by an important public policy.231 The public
policy exception is frequently attributed to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court's decision in Monge v Beebe Rubber Co.,232 which held the
discharge of an employee for her refusal to accede to a supervisor's sexual

29Id.
(SECOND)OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652C, 652D, and 652D (1977).
2"See Note, ProtectingEmployeesAt WillAgainst Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1931 (1983).
"2 Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
I'RESTATEMENT
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advances was actionable as a breach of contract.2 3 However, the origin
of this cause of action can be traced back to Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local,2 4 in which the court held it is
impermissible to discharge an employee for refusing to commit perjury.2This cause of action may be successful if an RMG is deselected or
discharged from the plan because he was properly ordering tests for his
patients. For example, courts applying this principle may uphold causes
of action when an IMG is discharged for refusing to violate laws relating
to the public health,236 for acting in accordance with professional
responsibilities,237 or for refusing to assist in illegal acts.?3 Therefore,
public law exception may prevent some IMGs from being dismissed or
deselected if they ordered more tests for their patients because their patient
population, on the average, has higher medical risks. In fact, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in Harperv. Healthsource23 9 usedthe bad faith
and public policy doctrine in deciding for the wrongfully terminated
physician.24 While this is the first victory of its kind for physicians and
will probably be applied by other state courts, its importance is not yet
known.
Anti-Discrimination Statutes
Statutory law may offer greater protection for IMGs than common law
actions. The primary laws concerned are anti-discrimination and antitrust
statutes. Moreover, various states are currently attempting to pass laws
aimed at protecting physicians against unreasonable MCO actions which
may also be used to protect an IMG's legitimate interests.
There are no federal or state laws that explicitly prohibit
discrimination against IMGs. It is probably not unlawful for MCOs to
explicitly declare that it is their policy not to include IMGs in their plan.
However, since the majority of IMGs are not born in the United States,
such a discriminatory policy will have a systemic disparate impact on race

233id.
' 4petermanv. InternationalBrotherhoosatTeamstersLocal,344 P.2d 25(25 Cal. Ct. App.

1959).

351d.

' 60'Sulivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d 149 (N.J. Super. 1973).
"Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
.. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal.19SO).
"Harper
v. Healthsource, N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996).
40
2 1d.
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and national origin which is clearly prohibited by the Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.241 Moreover, section 1981 demands that everyone be
treated like a "white man".242 Therefore, because of the prohibitions on
discrimination, an MCO is unlikely to have an explicit policy for
excluding IMGs.
TITLE VII PROTECTIONS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII243 is a major component of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24 Title
V11, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,245
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,246 prohibits employment discrimination
on account of race, color, religion, sex and national origin.247 Title VII
provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
othenvise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national ongin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such248individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Thus, on its face, Title VII applies to employment discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, gender or national origin. The underlying purpose
of Title VII is to remove artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to
24142 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (Supp. V 1993).
242

ld.

243

Id.

2
"Id.
245
1d"

24642 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1993).
2 47

1d.

248

1d.
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employment when those barriers operate to24discriminate
on the basis of
9
characteristics.
protected
race, sex, or other
In general, the Title VII actions tend to take one of five forms:
(1) a charge that an employer deliberately discriminated against
the plaintiff(s) because of race, sex or another protected
characteristic (kmown as an individual disparate treatment
claim);
(2) a charge that the employment or enrollment policies have a
sweeping effect on specific protected groups (kmown as
systemic disparate treatment claim);
(3) a charge that the employer used a facially neutral policy or
practice that unjustifiably resulted in discrimination against
members of a protected group (a disparate impact claim);
(4) a charge that an employer retaliated against an employee for
filing a discrimination claim;
(5) or a charge that the employer constructively discharged an
employee because of his or her race, sex, etc.L
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, Title VII requires only
a showing of disparate impact to establish a primafacie case of racial
discrimination. 25 Under the 1991 amendments, once a plaintiff has
carried the burden of proving disparate impact, an employer must
articulate a valid business justification for the practice in order to escape
liability. 2 2 The term "business justification," however, is not defined in
the statute. 253
Since Title VII does not apply to independent contractorsY 4 one of
the essential components of a Title VII claim is to first establish that the

49
Sink v. Knox County Hosp., 900 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
250JUDGE RICHEY, MANU.AL OF EMPLOY'mENT DisCRmIATiON AND CIVIL RIGHT ACTIONS
(1996).

2'See,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) providing that an unlawful employment practice
based on disparate impact is established if: [A] complaining party demonstrates that a respondent
uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, ornational origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice
is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. 42 US.C. §§
2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i).
'5Cathcart & Synderman, THE CVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, ALI-ABA Course of Study,
Advanced
Employment Law and Litigation (1992), at §§ 1.04(b)(l), (3).
3
2 Id. at § 1.04(b)(3).
2Ost v. West Suburban Travelers Limousine, Inc., 88 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 1996).
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MCO is an employer, and the relationship between the MCO and
physician is an employer-employee arrangement within the meaning of
Title VII. While showing this could be a simple task, it is not so simple
when the relationship is loosely arranged, such as those between
physicians and open panel MCOs. Therefore, in practice, showing this
will be dependent on the structure of the MCO and the amount of
control2 5 the MCO exercises over the plan physicians. Unfortunately,
the statute defines employer and employees rather loosely. It states:
(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, and .... 256
(d) Business--For the purposes of this section, the term 'business'
includes-(6) (A) a corporation including nonprofit corporations;
(B) a partnership;
(C) a professional association;
(D) a labor organization; and
(E) a business entity similar to an entity described in
subparagraphs (A) through (D);
(2) an education referral program, a training program, such
as an apprenticeship or management training program or
a similar program... 257
Like all other definitions in Title VII, courts liberally interpret the
definition of employer. 58 In fact, some courts have gone beyond the
traditional relationship, finding the employer-employee requirement
satisfied in situations involving economic necessity and third-party
interference with employment.259 In these situations, a cause of action was
sustained even where the party alleged to have violated Title VII was not

25
SDiggs v. Harris Hosp.-Methodist, 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1988), cerl. denied, 488 U.S.
956 (1988). The court applied the economic necessity test to the termination of an AfricanAmerican physician's staff privileges.
25642 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-(b).
Sid.
... Chester v. Northwest Iowa Youth Emergency Servs. Ctr., 869 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Iowa

1994). See also, Quijano v. University Federal Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980).
2

"Chester, 869 F. Supp. at 702.
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a direct employer of the plaintiff.260 To determine whether the defendant
was an employer within the meaning of Title VII, the courts first
determine whether the defendant had substantial control over significant
aspects of compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of plaintiffs
employment.261 In order to distinguish between employees and
independent contractors, courts generally use a test that combines the
"right to control" and "economic realities" standards. 262 Right to control
an employee's work means the right to direct the work of the individual
not only as to the result, but also as to the details by which that result is
achieved.263 Other factors, such as ownership of equipment necessary for
the job's performance, responsibility for costs associated with operating
that equipment, responsibility for obtaining insurance, responsibility for
maintenance and operating supplies, ability to influence profits, length of
time commitment, form of payment and directions on schedules or on
performing work, are considered in showing an employment
relationship. 264 Under the so-called hybrid test, courts consider all
circumstances of the work relationship including right to control, rather
than the borrowed servant doctrine, to determine whether a defendant is
a contractor or an employer.265 Under this test, courts examine economic
realities underlying the relationship between plaintiff and defendant in an
effort to determine whether the defendant is likely to be susceptible to
discriminatory practices which the Act was designed to eliminate.2 Courts have applied this hybrid economic reality control test to nontraditional employment in the health care environment. For example, in
Diggs v. Harris Hospital-MetZodit 6 1 the court applied the economic
necessity test to the termination of an African-American physician's staff

260

M1d

26t Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992). Sce also,
Norman v. Levy, 756 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. 111.1990).
262
Navy King v. Dalton, 895 F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Va. 1995).
26
Goudeau v. Dental Health Servs., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1139 (M.D, La, 1995),
6'4Jason v. Baptist Hosp., 872 F. Supp. 1575 (E.D. Tex. 1994). See also, Vakhana v.

Swedish Covenant Hosp., 765 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Anesthesiologist alleged fects that
would establish employment relationship, required for Title VII claim, between herself and
hospital or between herself and her patients or prospective patients; anesthesiologist obtained
patients through assignment by hospital and referral by staff physicians at the hospital %,,ho
requested her services. Id.

' 5Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 1994).
265

Vakharia, 765 F. Supp. at 461.

267847 F.2d 270 (5t' Cir. 1988).
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privileges.268 In addition to the basic analysis, the Diggs court noted
additional factors which could be considered in establishing an employeremployee relationship, including whether the work provided is an integral
part of the business of the employer and the intention of the parties.269
Although the Diggscourt did not find an employer-employee relationship,
the court stressed that the privileges at issue were not an economic
necessity because the plaintiff enjoyed staff privileges at other
institutions. 2 0 This decision suggests that the existence of economic
necessity may be sufficient to establish the required relationship. Thus,
if a physician or IMG can prove a relationship with the defendant MCO
is necessary for him to practice medicine, it is possible that a court
applying the economic reality and common law control test would find a
Title VII employment relationship. On the other hand, if there are several
open panel MCOs the plaintiff physician can join, then in the absence of
any legal requirements, it is unlikely any court would find board
certification an economic necessity.
Title VII's broad definition of employer includes an agent of the
employer if he, by virtue of supervisory position, participates in
discriminatory actions that are the subject of the claim.27 ' The test for
determining whether a person is an agent of an employer who can be held
liable for discrimination under Title VII is whether the alleged agent has
participated in the decision-making process that forms a basis of
discrimination.272 Of great interest to IMGs, the Supreme Court has
interpreted race discrimination to include discrimination based on national
origin and ethnicity. 273 Furthermore, an employee's status as "alien" (i.e.,
without proper work authorization) does not disqualify him from bringing
Title VII action against his employer.274
Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination
Assuming that an employer-employee relationship is found, one needs to
show primafacie discrimination under an individual disparate treatment

263
29

1d"

1 1d. at 272-73.

270

Id. at 273.
v. Memphis Housing Auth., 780 F. Supp. 1168 (W.D. Tenn. 1991).
Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys. (Voorhees Div.), 847 F. Supp. 1232 (D, N.J. 1994).
273
St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
274
Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 95 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 1996).
27
27'Fauser
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27
test.27
Under this test, an IMG may establish a primafacie case of
discrimination by showing:

(1) he belongs to a protected group (i.e. race or national origin);
(2) he has applied to an MCO or has been deselected from a plan
for which he was qualified;
(3) he was not selected (or hired) or subjected to some other
adverse MCO decision; and
(4) the position remained open or other similarly-situated
employees outside the protected group were not subjected to
the same adverse employment decision.276
Once an 1MG establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defendant MCO must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its action. 2' The MCO need not persuade the court it was actually
motivatedby its proffered reasons.2 8 It is sufficient ifthe MCO's evidence
raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the
IMG.279 For example, the MCO could say it has not selected the IMG
because he was not board certified or deselected him because the IMG's
patient satisfaction was poor. If correct, these are probably acceptable
legitimate reasons to rebut an individual's claim of disparate treatment
discrimination. For example, in Betkenrr, M.D. v. Aultman Hospital
Association, 0 the hospital successfully rebutted aprimafacieindividual
disparate treatment challenge by showing it relied on its search
committee's recommendation which was made after hearing presentations
from both candidates and after reviewing a report prepared by an outside
28
consultant. '

2 5
' Mcdonnell
276

Id.

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,792 (1973).

277Id.
278
2

1d.

.. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
2"Betkerur, M.D. v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1996).
2"Id. at 1080. Hospital which selected a white, American-born doctor as Director of
Neonatology rather than a doctor from India with comparable qualifications establshed a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision by showing that it relied on the cearch

committee's recommendation.

The committee made its recommendation after hearin

presentations from both candidates, and after reviewing a report prepared by an outside
consultant, which recommended the white, American-born doctor. The report preferred the wxhite
doctorbecause oftraining programs, leadership in securing referrals from the medical community,
and the ability to lead the hospital's neonatal intensive care unit to a higher rating. Id.
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Once the defendant MCO articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action, the IMG then must demonstrate
that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the MCO's
decision.282 This burden merges with the IMG's ultimate burden of
persuading the court he was a victim of intentional discrimination.283 In
Warren v. City of Carlsbad,28 4 a Mexican-American firefighter was
successful in showing he was not promoted to a fire captain position
because of his national origin.285 On the other hand, in Gomez v.
Allegheny Health Services, Inc.,28 6 a Colombian staff surgeon who was
terminated because he was not receiving enough referrals from
was not found to be subjected to
cardiologists to support his position
2
national origin discrimination. 11
Systemic Disparate Treatment Discrimination
In addition to individual disparate treatment charges, IMGs also can
challenge a MCO's sweeping selection and deselection policies that have
a systemic effect on IMGs as a group. For example, an MCO policy
selecting only United States medical school graduate physicians or
separating physicians by country of origin raises systemic treatment
issues. The theory of systemic disparate treatment is actionable under
Title VII288 and section 1981.
"28Id.
- 3Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248.
'Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 1995), cerl. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1261

(1996).

285

1d. at 443-44. A Mexican-American firefighter established a genuine issue of material

fact that he was not promoted to a fire captain position on the basis of his national origin by
showing others who had scored lower on the fire captain's test and were white were promoted,
only one fire captain in the last 19 years was a minority, he heard the Fire Chief make a derogatory

comment about Hispanics, and he was denied the promotion based on a subjective determination
of his lack of interpersonal skills. Id.
286
Gomez v. Allegheny Health Sen's., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079 (3d Cir. 1995),pelitionfor cert.
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3709 (U.S. Apr. 11, 1996) (No. 95-1642).
287
1d. at 1079. A Columbian staff surgeon, who was terminated because he was not
receiving enough referrals from cardiologists to support his position, was not subjected to national

origin discrimination, because the evidence showed the cardiologists made referrals based on their

professional judgment as to what was best for their patients, and their refusal to refer patients to
the plaintiff resulted from their own prior unsatisfactory experiences with him. In addition,
criticisms by one doctor that the plaintiff looked and sounded foreign were insufficient to prove
discrimination because that doctor praised and referred patients to other foreign doctors, had no

control over other doctors' referrals, and had no authority to hire or fire plaintiff. Id. at 1084-85.
284 2 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
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Systemic disparate treatment can be proven in two ways. First, IMGs
may demonstrate that the MCO's formal policy of selection and/or
deselection is discriminatory. 2 9 Second, if IMGs fail to prove a formal
discriminatory policy, they may still try to establish that the MCO's
pattern ofphysician selection or deselectionpolicyhas disparate treatment
on race or country of origin.29" Usually, sophisticated statistical analysis
and inferential proofs along with actual cases of anecdotal evidence are
required to show systemic treatment.291
Similar to an individual disparate treatment claim, once the plaintiff
establishes the primafacie evidence of discrimination, the defendant is
allowed to rebut the presumption of discrimination through an
individualized showing that no one particular person is a victim of the
discriminatory practice pattern.292 Under a systemic disparate treatment
claim, however, a plaintiffwho establishes aprimafaciecase and proves
that the defendants' legitimate, non-discriminatory decision are pre-textual
is not automatically entitled to prevail.2 93 Such proof is only sufficient for
showing the evidence of intentional discrimination, especially if it is
accompanied by suspicion of mendacity.294 In general, in order to prevail
under systemic disparate treatment, a plaintiff must use fine tuned
statistics such as identifying themost appropriate population and statistical
comparison group. 295
Systemic Disparate Impact Discrimination
A disparate impact case is one in which a plaintiff alleges that a facially
neutral policy of the defendant falls more harshly on one group than

2 Id.

29Id.
7'Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
2EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1991).

2-Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 71 F.3d 837, 840 (1 th Cir. 1996). A Hispanic doctor-who was
terminated failed to present direct evidence of discrimination when she stated that an AfricanAmerican supervisor told her he wanted a black person in herjob. The suparvisor denied he ever
made the statement and the district court credited his testimony over the plaintiff's. Since the

district court heard both individuals testify at length, and thus had an opportunity to az.ezs their
credibility, its decision to credit the supervisor's testimony over the plaintiff's was not clearly
erroneous. Id. at 843.
2'St.Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993).
95EEOC, 947 F.2d at 204.
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another and cannot be justified by business necessity.2 96 Proof of
discriminatory motive is not required under the disparate impact
analysis.297 Once an IMG establishes a primafacie case of disparate
impact by statistical evidence, the MCO must articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason such as business necessity, job-relatedness or
employment practice, and then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show either their employer's reason is pretext for discrimination, or there
exists an alternative employment practice without a disparate impact that
298
also serves the employer's legitimate interests.
In the past, disparate impact analysis has typically been applied to
health care settings when a physician was denied hospital privileges or
board certification.2 99 Assuming an employer-employee relationship was
found, the courts applied the usual disparate impact test for finding a Title
VII violation. 00 Aprimafacie case requires a showing that:
(1) the plaintiff belongs to a racial minority;
(2) the plaintiff was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants;
(3) despite these qualifications, the plaintiff was rejected for the
position; and,
(4) after this rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applications from persons of the
complainant's qualifications.3"'
Even if aprimafaciecase be demonstrated by the plaintiff, a claim still
may be defeated by showing a valid business justification for the allegedly
discriminatory practice.30 2 In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically

296

International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, n.15 (1977); See

also, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971).

2"Id.
298

1d.
'Muzquizv. W.A. Foote Mem'l Hosp., 70 F.3d422 (6th Cir. 1995). A Mexican-American
doctor failed to establish that requiring doctors who wished to obtain invasive cardiology

privileges provide films and charts of their prior cardiac catheterizations had a disparate impact
on doctors of Mexican heritage. The difficulty in obtaining the required items impacted on those

who had trained in Mexico, not those who were of Mexican heritage. Id. at 429.
300Id. at 429.
3'McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
32id.
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stated in Furnco Construction Corporationv. Waters,30 3 the test should
not be applied rigidly, but is to serve as "a sensible, orderly way to
evaluate the evidence in light of common
experience as it bears on the
34
critical question of discrimination." 0
Limitation of Title VII Claims in
Non-Staff MCO Settings
Even if an IMG physician can show he is protected under Title VII, he
may have difficulty proving a Title VII claim. Decisions concerning the
quality of medical care provided by physicians are so subjective that
proving racial or country of origin discrimination may be next to
impossible except in particularly egregious circumstances. Without direct
evidence of discrimination, aggrieved physicians would have to prove a
disparate impact claim, which may be rather daunting under the 1991
amendments to Title V1I." Establishing a prima facie case in the
physician-discrimination context might require statistical evidence
demonstrating that the exclusion of an inordinately large number of
qualified 1MG physicians was due to the selection criteria used by the
MCO. 6 Even after a showing ofprimafacieevidence of discrimination,
the defendant MCO could rebut the presumption by proving the selection
criteria is "consistent with business necessity." 31 MCOs asserting
selection criteria associated with cost-conscious assessments to help
control business costs would likely clear this hurdle.30 3 Thus, IMG
physicians would face an uphill battle in proving Title VII claims.
3

nFumeo Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
314Id. at 577.
3
-The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides statutory guidelines for the adjudication of
disparate impact suits under Title VII. It does so by amending Title VII to add § 703(I)(1 A)
which states that:

An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this title only if-

(i) a Complaining party dcmonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
Challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent vith
business necessity....
"Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bd. Of
Teamsters v. United States,, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
"Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (7th Cir. 1992).

303Id.
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Section 1981 Action
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870309 provides independent
causes of action reaching private acts of discrimination and does not
preempt relief under Title VII. 31° Section 1981 states:
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.31'
This language addresses intentional racial discrimination by public
and private parties.312 Coverage is limited to four specifically enumerated
activities:
(1) making and enforcing a contract;
(2) suing in court and giving evidence;
(3) securing the benefits of law; and
31 3
(4) receiving punishment, licenses, taxes, and penalties.
Amendments in 1991 reinforced both the protection of contractual rights
and the applicability to non-government actions. 314 Specifically, the

3
3

May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 stat. 140.
'Pittman v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 408 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. N.C. 1974).
3"42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
" 2See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375,382-90 (1982)
(proposing that § 1981 only reaches intentional and purposeful discrimination). There is some
debate as to whether § 1981 covers white persons who are discriminated against on the basis of
national origin, religion or race. See Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 842 F.2d 291,295 (11 th Cir.
1988). Despite the reservation of some courts, it is not inconceivable that a court would find §
1981 coverage for an ostensibly "white" foreign national discriminated against on the basis of
national origin, race, religious beliefs or other covered category.
"'Brown v. Federation of State Med. Bds. of the U.S., No. 82-C-7398, 1985 WL 1659, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1985).
" 4Specifically, the 1991 Civil Rights Act added subsections (b) and (c) to address these
issues:
(b) Forpurposes ofthis section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c)The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b), (c),
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amendment now prohibits discrimination not just in the formation of
contracts, but also in their performance, benefits, terms and conditions.3"5
The language of section 1981 expressly prohibits race discrimination
in the making and enforcement of contracts and in employment claims.3t 6
Thus, race discrimination claimants could join claims under section 1981
with claims under Title VII because section 1981, unlike Title VII, does
37
not limit the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.
Moreover, considering the Supreme Court holding in St. FrancisCollege
v. A1-Khazraji,1 8 which interpreted race discrimination to include discrimination based on national origin and ethnicity,319 claimants such as IMGs
which may have a claim based on national origin or ethnicity, can bring
claims under section 1981 along with Title VII.
In addition to action against direct discrimination, section1981 can
also be applied to parties having an indirect influence on a protected
individual's right to contract. For example, in Zaklama i. Mr. Sinai
Medical Center,320 section 1981 applied to a foreign-born IMG's claim to
find that his dismissal from a residency program under the influence of a
third party was discriminatory.32 ' This is an important holding since
MCOs could become liable if they use their power to influence the
physician group (i.e. IPA) to drop their IMG members before contracting

"'For example, in Strotherv. Southern Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F. 3d $59 (9th Cir.
1996) an African-American doctor who was a partner in a medical group was not entitled to
challenge any of her promotion denials under § 1981 which occurred prior to the 1991 Civil
Rights Act Amendments because they did not occur during the formation of the partnership
contract, nor did they rise to the level ofan opportunity for a new and distinct relationship btwen
the plaintiff and the defendant. However, discrimination which occurred after the 1991 Civil
Rights Act Amendments may be actionable under §1981 because the amendment prohibits
discrimination not just in the formation of contracts, but also in their performance, benefits, terms
andconditions. Therefore, aplaintiff's allegations that afterNovember 12,1991 shewas excluded
frommeetings, denied appointments and secretarial support, and given an increased worklo2l and
heightened performance standards may be actionable discrimination under § 1981.
"'Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); sec also, Swvapsahire v. Baer,
865 F.2d 948 (Sth Cir.1989).
3'Id. at 454.

3"'St. Francis College v. Ali Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
319Id. at 606.
0

32Zakloma v. St. Shai Med. Ctr., 842 F.2d 291 (1Ith Cir. 1988).
321Id. at 295.
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with them.32 2 In this case, to bring an action against an MCO
there is need
323
for privity between the disgruntled 1MG and the MCO.
In general, a traditional contract need not be at issue for an individual
to maintain a section 1981 challenge. As a result, section 1981 has been24
applied to situations where physicians were denied hospital privileges.
Unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 1981 requires

intentional and purposeful discrimination and does not reach practices
which are neutral on their face and neutral in intent, although

discriminatory in effect.3 25 Under this statute, the jury must determine
whether discrimination was a causal factor in the challenged employment
decision. 26
It is not clear whether a primafacie case of discrimination exists
when an MCO has employed subjective criteria, such as clinical
competency or character requirements, to deny an IMG's application or as
reasons for deselection.327 However, considering that the courts are
reluctant to apply section 1981 liberally, and in light of the holding in
Betkerur, MD. v. Aultman Hospital Association,32 the outlook for

successful claims under section 1981 is not too promising for IMGs.

32

" Id. at 292-95. Specifically, Zaklama was employed as a resident by Jackson Memorial
Hospital. As part of his training, Zaklama was expected to rotate through three other local
hospitals, while still technically remaining a resident in the Jackson Memorial Program. At one
ofthese hospitals, Mt. Sinai Medical Center, Zaklamawas subject to negative evaluations and was
subsequently barred by Mt. Sinai staff from the hospital. On the basis of the Mt. Sinai actions,
Jackson Memorial terminated Zaklama's participation in its residency program. Note that
Zaklama alleged racial, national origin, and religious discrimination in his complaint against both
hospitals. Id. at 292-94.
3
'Id. at 295 (citing Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973))
(involving a challenge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)). See infra notes 104-7 and
accompanying text.
324
Shah v. Memorial Hosp., No. 86-0064-D, 1988 WL 161176 (W.D. Va. July 27, 1988),
aff'd, 875 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1989).
3
'2Swapshire v. Baer, 865 F.2d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing General Building
Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982)).
326 Model Civ. Jury Instr. § 5.20 (8th Cir.).
32
Given that such criteria are very infrequently invoked where an individual has
successfully completed an ACGME-accredited residency, such an argument may be difficult to
establish in practice.
328
Betkerur, M.D. v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1996). A neonatologist
from India failed to show a § 1981 violation when other doctors refused to refer patients to her.
The referring doctors established that their decision to refer more patients to a white, Americanbom neonatologist was based on her greater compatibility with their individual philosophies of
care, and her more skillful interactions with them and their patients. Id.
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Note on Comparing Section 1981 and Title VII
When subjected to prohibited discrimination, one may choose to bring
both a Title VII and a section 1981 action law suit concurrently. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that both statutes may be invoked either
concurrently or independently.329 In Johnsonv. Railway ExpressAgency ,
Inc.,330 the Supreme Court wrote: "We generally conclude, therefore, that
the remedies available under Title VII and under section 1981, although
related, and although directed to most of the same ends, are separate,
distinct, and independent." Thus, section 1981 may be pursued without
reference to Title VII.33
To take advantage of both statutes, a plaintiff must meet the
requirements of each statute as aprecondition to the suit.332 Generally, the
legal standards in section 1981 cases and Title VII cases are
interchangeable.333 However, as noted earlier, section 1981 requires
intentional discrimination.334 Unlike Title VII, under section 1981, a
primafacie case of discrimination cannot be shown through disparate
impact theory.335 On the other hand, section 1981 remedies are somewhat
broader than those available under Title VII due to the absence of a
statutory cap on damages. 36 Another advantage of section 1981 is that,
unlike Title VII, its coverage is not expressly limited to employment.3
For example, discrimination in partnership decisions is fully actionable.33
Also, the statute of limitations for section 1981 is generally longer than
that of Title VII. Therefore, in a case of intentional discrimination by an
MCO, section 1981 is probably the most relevant and useful statute to
consider.

"'Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,461 (1975).
D1d.
"'Taylorv. SafewayStores, Inc., 524 F.2d263 (10th Cir. 1975); Greshamv. Chamburs, 501
F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1974).
332Taylor, 524 F.2d at 265.
33
33

1 Mason v. Association for
33442 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
33
SId"
337Id.
33SId

Indep. Growth, 817 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa.1993).
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Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
IMGs and MCOs should also be aware of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 339 Section 601 of Title VI reads: "No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, orbe subjected to discrimination
340
under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance."
In 1988, Title VI was amended to provide that the terms "program or
activity" and "program" are defined as "all of the operations of... an
entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire
sole proprietorship ... which is principally engaged in the business of
providing ... health care, . . . any part of which is extended federal
financial assistance., 34' Therefore, if an MCO has Medicare and Medicaid
patient enrollees, it is also covered under Title VI and an aggrieved IMG
could bring an independent cause of action under Title VI.
Antitrust Actions
Several provisions of antitrust laws may prove to be useful tools for
disgruntled IMG physicians. Specifically, under the antitrust laws,
conspiracy, predatory pricing, exercising monopoly power, barriers to
entry and boycotts against or refusal to deal with IMGs could be unlawful.
Therefore, under certain circumstances, an aggrieved IMG may bring an
action against an MCO for antitrust violations. However, antitrust
violations are generally more difficult and costly to adjudicate and chance
of success is relatively low in the health care market. Nevertheless, a
successful plaintiff may be awarded treble damages and reasonable
attorney fees.342
Antitrust Actions in Health Care
343
While the use of antitrust laws in the health care profession is not new,
it has become more frequent in recent years because of dramatic changes
in the delivery of health care. 3"4 This is mainly due to the intense
33942 U.S.C. § 1981.
3401d.

31'Damiel K. Hampton, Title VI Challenges by PrivatePartiesto the Location of Health
CareFacilities:
Toward a Just and Effective Action, 37 B.C. L. REV. 517, 520, 525-32 (1996).
142See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 26.
343Robin E. Remis, Health Care and The Federal Antitrust Laws: The Likelihood of a
HarmoniousCoexistence, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &POL'Y 113 (1996).
344Id.
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competition among health care providers, consolidation in health care
facilities, 345 managed care pressure, and the emergence of integrated

delivery systems which resulted in an increasing number ofmergerss' and
foreclosure of the health care market for a large number of solo
practitioners.347
In general, for a plaintiff physician to be successful in antitrust

litigation, he must show: (1) a contract, combination or conspiracy among
the defendants that (2) resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade.3 In
addition to the naked conspiracy antitrust violation, the other concerns in
the current health care delivery market posing potential antitrust violations
are group boycotts,349 tying arrangements,35 monopolization, exclusive
dealing arrangements 35' and possibly price-fixing.352

For many years physicians have used antitrust laws primarily to
challenge the denial or termination of their hospital staff privileges,"'3
denial ofreferrals 354 and refusal of some hospitals to deal vith them (these
45

d.

G. SINGER, CURRENT IssuEs IN HOSPITAL MERGER ANALYsIS, in ANITUST
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS INA CHANGINGHEALTH CARE SYSTrE.i 127 (1994) (prezenting abrief
34ToBY

history of antitrust enforcement in hospital mergers and the effect of the hospital's financial
condition
and role of efficiencies on antitrust analysis).
47
3 Id.

3'"ld.
"United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 1992-1 Trade CaSs. (CCH) pp.
69,697 (D.N.H. 1992), atfd on reb'g,986 F.2d 5S9 (1st Cir. 1993).
...
A tying arrangement is generally defined as an agreement by one party to sell a product
only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a different ("tied") product. Sce Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States 356 U.S. 1, (1958). But sce, Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2
v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (concerning a "tying arrangement").
...NorthernPacificRy. Co., 356 U.S. at 3.
" See SINGER, supra note 349, at 219 (discussing non-price issues raised by altemative
systems).
3"3John J. Miles and Mary Susan Philip, HospitalsCaught in theAntitrustNet. An Or.n w1,,
24 DUQ. L. REv. 4S9, 493 n.6 (1985).

35Cooper v. Amster, 645 F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Two hospitals did not refer pattents
to a physician pursuant to their policy under which no referrals were made to a physician v,ho had
been on the staff for less than five years unless he or she was associated with other qualified
physicians. The court summarily dismissed the physician's claim that the hospitals had combined
to restrain trade in violation of § I of the Sherman Act (15 U.SC.A. § 1). The court stated the
physician was not in any way precluded from practicing medicine or from using the hopital's
facilities to treat his patients, and observed that there was no evidence that he had been singled out
for exclusion, that the hospitals' referral policy was unreasonable, or that any a2rcemant
concerning the plaintiff had ever existed between the two hospitals or their staffs. Id at 49. Sce
also, Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352 (,V.D. Pa. 1982). Hospital patients vho
expressed no preference as to a surgeon were assigned a surgeon by the head of the department
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actions are prohibited under section 1 of the Sherman Act355 ). However,
these actions were largely unsuccessful because plaintiffphysicians were
unable to prove all required elements of the Sherman Act, including
showing an actual conspiracy or the defendant's involvement in interstate
commerce.3 16 In some cases, the defendant hospitals were not held liable
because they were exempt from antitrust laws by the state entity
exemption, or courts used the less rigorous "rule of
reason" review instead
7
of more demanding per se standard of review3

of surgery. The court rejected the contention of a surgeon in private practice that the referral
policy discriminated against him in that the department head had an interest in referring such
patients either to himself or another staff surgeon not in private practice, and entered summary
judgment for the defendant hospital and four of its staff physicians named as defendants against
the surgeon's claim of illegal restraint of trade in violation of§ 1of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.A.
§ I). The court observed that if the surgeon's allegations of discrimination were true, then the
hospital and the staffphysicians were acting as a single economic entity and could not, as a matter
of law, have engaged in the concerted action required for liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act
(§ 4). The court went on to say that the surgeon's claim failed factually for the reason that none
of the defendant staffphysicians had any possible anticompetitive motive to engage in the alleged
conspiracy, inasmuch as none of them received monies derived from private patient fees and so
could not benefit economically from denying referrals to him. Id. at 355.
3
"SSections I and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2) provide in pertinent part as
follows:
§1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty. Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
§ 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony[.]
356See Miles & Philip, supra note 353, at 493.
3
57Id. Liability under § 1of the Sherman Act depends on the existence of a combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade. The required elements of a physician's case under § I will depend
upon whether the conduct of the defendant is deemed aperse violation of § 1, in which case no
proof need be offered as to its harmful effects on trade or the motivation of the defendant, or
whether the defendant's acts are analyzed under a "rule of reason," in which case the physician
must show either an anticompetitive purpose by the defendant hospital in acting as it did or an
anticompetitive effect of its acts upon the relevant market.
Using mainly "rule of reason" standard, most courts have held that a hospital is legally
incapable of conspiring with any of its officers, agents, or employees, including members of its
medical staff who may pass judgment on a physician's application for staff privileges. However,
some cases held that individual members of a hospital medical staff may conspire among
themselves in violation of § 1. In general, unless a plaintiff physician can show concertcd, as
opposed to unilateral, activity in restraint of trade, there can be no liability under § I of the
Sherman Act. Moreover, courts held no antitrust violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act when a
hospital denied staff privileges for a physician. Id.
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Using the rule of reason standard in denial of staff privilege cases,
most courts have held a hospital is legally incapable of conspiring with

any of its officers, agents or employees, including members of its medical
staff who may pass judgment on a physician's application for staff
privileges.35 8 Nevertheless, in some cases courts have held the individual

members of a hospital medical staff may conspire among themselves in
violation of section 1.319 In general, unless a plaintiff physician could

show evidence of actual concerted action or combination by different
MCOs (or independent members of an MCO), as opposed to unilateral
decision by an MCO, there can be no liability under section 1 of the

Sherman Act.360 Moreover, courts found no antitrust violation of section
358jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Balaklaw v. Lovell, 522
F. Supp. 892 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
59
0"ksanen v. Page Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir 1991).
3"In Friedman v. Delaware Cty. Mem'I Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Penn 1937), a
physician whose hospital staffprivileges were revoked sued under, inter alia, § 1ofthe Sherman
Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1). The court held that no combination in restraint of trade had occurred, and
granted summary judgment to the defendant. Although the physician contended that hospital
administrators had conspired with two other physicians on the hospital staff to revoke his
privileges, the court found no evidence that either of the other physicians had ever taken any
action with respect to the plaintiff physician except as specifically requested by comnmittees or
heads of the medical staff responsible for physician peer review and patient care quality. Stating
that the other physicians had acted only as agents of the hospital, the court noted that because the
hospital could not conspire with itself, there could be no conspiracy as a matter oflaw.
In Trepel v. PontiacOsteopathicHosp.,599 F. Supp. 14S4 (E.D. Mich. 1934), a hospital
refused to renew a contract for radiological services with a physician who supported the
construction of a new hospital, the court held the physician had no standing under the Sherman
Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1).
See also, Sokol v. University Hosp., Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1029 (D.C. Mass. 1975), in vhich

the court, in holding that a physician whose practice of cardiac surgery at a hospital had bean
restricted, had failed to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S CA. § 1). The court
said that when the act complained of is the act of a corporation, the fact that a number of the
corporation's personnel are required to concur to generate the corporation's act does not satisfy
the conspiracy requirement of the Sherman Act. Id.
In Vuciecevic v MacNeal Men'l Hosp. 572 F. Supp. 1424 (N.D, Il1.1933), a physician
alleged that a hospital and several of its staffmembers had engaged in a group boycott in violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1) by denying him staff privileges. The court, in
denying summary judgment for the defense held that per so analysis of the claim was not
appropriate because the judiciary had insufficient acquaintance with health care regulation to
justify application of a per se rule in that context. The court went on to say that the denial of
privileges couldberegarded as aspecies of industry regulation, and cited authority for application
of the rule ofreason ifa three-parttest was satisfied: (1) a mandate for self-regulation, (2) action
consistent with the policyjustifying self-regulation and no more extensive than necesary, and (3)
application of procedural safeguards. The court found the first requirement satisfied by the
obligation ofhospitals to insure the competence ofstLffphysicians. The second requirement was
met because staff physicians had advised the hospital with regard to its decision, The third
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2 of the Sherman Act3 6 ' when a hospital denied staff privileges for a
3 62 363
physician. ',

requirement was met because the hospital provided procedural safeguards which insured that
anticompetitive intent was not disguised as regulation.
36115 U.S.C.A. § 2 (prohibiting monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy
to monopolize
trade or commerce).
362
In Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp. Med. Cir., 733 F.2d 1007 (2nd Cir.
1984), the court affirmed the dismissal of the anesthesiologist's claim that the hospital and the
corporation had conspired and attempted to monopolize the market for anesthesia services in the
county where the hospital was located in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 2).
In Kaczanowski v. Medical Cr. Hosp., 612 F. Supp. 688 (D. Ver. 1985), the court, in
granting summary judgment to the defense, held that by denying staff privileges to two podiatrists
pursuant to their bylaws, the defendant hospitals had not attempted or conspired to monopolize
trade in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 2). Although conceding that
individual physicians on the hospitals' medical staffs might have had an anticompetitive wish to
exclude podiatrists from the staffs, this did not indicate an anticompetitive motive on the part of
the hospitals. There was no evidence that the hospitals, in denying staff privileges, had acted in
willful pursuit of a monopoly or for any purpose other than maintaining their professional
standards for patient care. Id.
In Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), the court, in reversing in part a
judgment for an osteopathic physician who was denied hospital privileges, held that although he
had sufficiently proven a local monopoly by the hospital in the provision of inpatient hospital
services, he had failed to show that the hospital had willfully acted to maintain that monopoly and
so could not prevail on a claim of monopolization in violation of§ 2 of the Sherman Act. Id.
In Miller v. IndianaHosp., 814 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. 1992), the court held that without
evidence demonstrating hospital's ability to exert market dominance in relevant geographic
market, physician whose staff privileges were revoked could not show violation of 15 U.S.C.A.

§ 2.

363

Smith v. Bums Clinic Med. Ctr., P. C., 779 F.2d 1173 (6th Cir. 1985). Hospital staff
physicians alleged that physicians of an independent clinic, who had been hired by the hospital
to staff the hospital's emergency room, were discriminating in favor of other clinic physicians in
referring emergency room patients for follow up medical care, and that this conduct constituted
monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of§ 2 of the Sherman Act. The court
in affirming a summary judgment for the defense, held that even if the staff physicians could show
they had been denied a fair share of referrals, they had failed to create an issue of fact as to
necessary elements of their claims. The court noted that even if the defendant had engaged in
anticompetitive behavior, the staff physicians had not shown what portion of the relevant market
had been consumed by its actions and so had not created an issue of fact as to the clinic's intent
to monopolize or its probability of success in doing so. Id.
See also, Aron v. Michigan Health Care Corp., 593 F. Supp. 607 (D. Nev. 1984), in which
a physician denied hospital referrals pursuant to a bylaw providing that a new physician could not
receive referrals for a period of one year sued under § 2 of the Sherman Act, alleging that the
referral policy constituted monopolization and attempted monopolization; the court, in denying
the physician a preliminary injunction, stated that the hospital was justified in adopting the policy
at issue because it gave the hospital an opportunity to observe a physician's work. Id,
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Managed Care and Antitrust Laws
Over the past several years, the number of antitrust cases involving MCOs
has risen as MCOs become more accepted as alternative methods of health
care delivery.364 These antitrust cases generally fall into four categories. S
The first category consists of monopoly actions, including those brought
by:
(1) one MCO against another for foreclosure of the market;2

(2) actions by MCOs against large insurers;t2- 7 or
(3) actions by health care providers against large insurers for
adopting cost-containment strategies?"3

The second category includes actions for tying arrangements brought by:
(1) a small MCO against a larger MCO

hospitals. 370

369

or (2) physicians against

The third category encompasses actions for group boycotts

3" Mark L. Glassman, Can HMOs Wield Market Power? 46 A.1. U. L. REV. 91 (1996)
(assessing antitrust liability in the imperfect market for health care financing).
'6"Id. at 94.
'See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 141113 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding HMO not liable for monopolization because of lack of market power
within relevant product market), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996); United States Healthcare,
Inc. v. Healthsources, Inc., 9S6 F.2d 589, 597-99 (1' Cir. 1993) (finding that HMO lacked
sufficient market power within relevant product market to form monopoly).
7See Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., S53
F.2d 1101, 1109-11 (Ist Cir. 1989) (holding insurer not liable in suit brought by HMO under
Sherman Act § 2 for setting maximum insurance reimbursement at no greater than payment by
competing HMO).
363See Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335-36 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that formation of preferred provider organization ("PPO") by large insurer did not
violate Sherman Act § 2 in suitbrought by hospital because, interalia, ease of entry for compe.tmg
HMOs prevented attainment of market power); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d
922,927,933 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating that despite market power, insurers prohibition of "balance
billing" by participating physicians does not violate Sherman Act § 2 unless payments fall so low
as to constitute predatory pricing).
'69See Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 95-1698, 1996 U S Dist
LEXIS 6480, at 16-22 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 1996) (denying motion for summary judgment by
defendant HMO, U.S. Healthcare, and holding that plaintiffHMO, Brokerage Concepts, prezented
"legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find" that U.S. Healthcare
implemented tying arrangement to obtain enrollees).
...SeeJefferson ParishHosp. Diss. No. 2 v.Hyde, 466 U.S. 31-32 (1984) (holding hospital
not liable for tying arrangement in violation of Sherman Act §§ I and 2 after hospital awarded
exclusive contract for anesthesiology services to group practice). A Lying arrangement occurs
when a supplier uses market power over one product to attain power or to otherwjse manipulate
competition over another product See id. at 12-13 (citing Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495,512-14 (1969) (White, J., dissenting)). Such an arrangement exists v,hen the
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brought by: (1) physicians against MCOs for exclusion from medical

staff;371 (2) hospitals or MCOs against insurers for exclusion from a
payment plan; 372 or (3) MCOs and other payors against providers for

attempting to create barriers to the entry of managed care entities into the

market. 373 The fourth category comprises actions for market division or
price-fixing by an MCO, preferred provider organization (PPO), or
insurer.374 Although some of these cases do not directly involve MCOs as
375
parties, many have resulted from the increased concentration of MCOs.
In all of these actions, with few exceptions, 376 when the defendant had

practice in question "link[s] two distinct markets for products that were distinguishable in the eyes
of buyers." Id. at 19 (citingTimes-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 600
(1953)).

371
See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786,815 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding physician members
of hospital medical staff liable for Sherman Act § 1group boycott after they denied peer medical
staffprivileges at hospital, but finding medical staff incapable of conspiring with hospital). But
see, Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 851 F.2d 1273, 1280 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding that hospital
and medical staff are legally capable of conspiring in Sherman Act § Iviolation). Although the
courts in Weiss and Bolt based their analyses primarily on Sherman Act § 1,group boycotts also
are prohibited
by § 3 of the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994).
372
See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 965-66 (10th Cir.
1990) (finding insurer liable for horizontal group boycott in violation of Sherman Act § I under
rule ofreason when it threatened to terminate contract ofhospital recently acquired by competitor
and lowered reimbursement of other providers doing business with competitor). But see, U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 592-93 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding HMO not
liable for horizontal group boycott underperse analysis when it offered higher reimbursement to
physicians for agreeing not to provide services to any other HMOs).
373
See, FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,458-66 (1986) (holding that group
of dentists violated Sherman Act § 1 when it concertedly refused to provide x-rays to insurers),
The Court in Indiana Federation ofDentists struggled with the question of whether the case fit into
the group boycott "pigeonhole," id. at 458, or whether it was a price-fixing case. See id. at 45961. The Court, however, was interested more in avoiding application of a strict per se test than
in finding a perfect label for the case. See id. at 458-59. Ultimately, the Court found that it was
"not a matter of any great difficulty" to apply a rule of reason balancing test to the facts of the
case. Id. at 459. The Court thereby engaged in an early application of what now is known as the
"quick look" test for determining violations of Sherman Act § 1. See U.S. Healthcare,986 F.2d
at 594 (citing Indiana Fed'n of Dentists as early example of"quick look" formulation).
374
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-57 (1982) (holding
doctor-initiated PPO liable for per se offense of price fixing under Sherman Act § 1, after
physician members of PPO comprising 70% of all those practicing in county, set maximum
reimbursement rates); Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d
1406, 1415-16 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding HMO liable forperse offense ofmarket division and price
fixing 37
in violation of Sherman Act s 1), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1288 (1996).
Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 345.
376
Price fixing and market division generally are held to be illegalperseunder Sherman Act
§ 1. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). This rule obviates
the need for a plaintiffto show that a defendant possessed market power and eliminates defenses
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"market power,"'3 the defendants were found not to have violated the
antitrust laws.
Refusal to Deal
While historically the success of antitrust lawsuits against MCOs is rather
small, nevertheless, it is possible that the effort to exclude IMGs as a
group from MCO plans will increase the chance of successful antitrust
litigation under the heading of a concerted refusal to deal.
37
Normally, any person is free to deal with whomever he pleases. 3
This general rule, however, is limited by the essential facilities or
bottleneck doctrine arising from the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. TerminalRailroadAssociation" Under this doctrine, there are

four requirements for establishing liability for a refusal to deal by a
monopolist:
based on reasonableness. See id. at 218. Courts, however, frequently engage in a balancing
inquiry to determine whether a certain action can be properly characterized as price fixing. The
Court in Maricopa County held a price fixing agreement to be illegal as a matter of law when
prices charged by a physician group were set by members of the group. Sec id On remand,
however, the district court held that the arrangement was no longer a price-fixing agrecmant
worthy ofperse
prohibition when consumers were placed on the price-setting committee. Sece id
7
37See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 26, 29 (19S4) (requiring

showing of market power for per se liability to attach under Clayton Act § 3 for tying
arrangement, and finding insufficient evidence of market power); Reazin, 899 F.2d at 965-66
(applying rule of reason and market power assessment to find insurer liable for horizontal group
boycott in violation of Sherman Act § 1 when insurer terminated contract of hospital recently
acquired by competitor and discouraged other health service providers from doing busine:s vith
competing insurers as condition of reimbursement); Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101, 1109-11 (Ist Cir. 1989) (holding insurer not
liable in suit brought by HMO under Sherman Act § 2 for setting maximum insurance
reimbursement at no greater than payment by competing HMO, despite existence of market
power); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc. 784 F.2d 1325,1330,1334-35 (7th Cir.
1986) (requiring market power for violation of Sherman Act § 2, but finding that defendant lacked
market power in medical insurance when market share was 27% of patients in Indiana); Kartell
v. Blue Shield of Mass., 749 F.2d 922, 924 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding no violation by insurer of
Sherman Act § 2 for setting maximum reimbursement amount, despite 74% market share). But
see, Marshfield,65 F.3d at 1415-16 (finding HMO liable for market division and price fixing in
violation of Sherman Act § 1underper se analysis, without market power analysis).
Market power is defined as "the ability ofa firm (or agroup of firms, actingjointly) to raiza
price above the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly that the price increae
is unprofitable and must be rescinded." Such power can be assessed only after a "market" has
been appropriately designated. The ability to define the relevant product market and determine
market power within that market, therefore, is crucial to virtually all antitrust actions in the health
care field.
MUnited States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
37
1United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
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(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist;
(2) no practicable or reasonable ability to duplicate the essential
facility;
(3) the denial of the competitor's use of the facility; and
(4) the feasibility of providing the facility.38
In most cases the first and third requirements are easy to prove; the second
requirement may be an area of dispute. The fourth requirement is
generally the subject of conflict due to a business justification defense.
At present, refusal to deal actions have been effectively limited to
actions under section 1 of the Sherman Act38' because hospitals and
managed care entities operate in highly competitive markets. As a result,
in the past several years numerous antitrust cases involving exclusions
from managed care entities have been pled as conspiracies under section
1 of the Sherman Act. 82 The reason is simple. When concerted action is
present, evidence of market power in the relevant market is unnecessary
because courts use a per se standard of review.383 However, at a
minimum, it is still necessary to identify the actual harms resulting from
the defendant's exclusionary action, as opposed to simply identifying
harm to the plaintiff.38 4 Even though section 1 of Sherman Act may lessen
the burden of market analysis, demonstrating the necessary conspiracy
element presents its own difficulties. In MatsushitaElectricIndustrialCo.
v. Zenith Radio Corporation,385 the Supreme Court articulated the standard
for finding a conspiracy as follows: A plaintiff "must show that the
inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences
of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed the
plaintiff., 386 To satisfy the Matsushita standard, a plaintiff typically must

8

Old. at 516.
1 of the Sherman Act provides that "every contract, combination . . .or

"'Section

conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states... is declared to be illegal
...
" The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress could not possibly have intended the word
"every" to be given a literal interpretation. Thus, most alleged restraints of trade are subject to the
"rule ofreason," which requires the factfinder to evaluate all relevant market factors and to balance
the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of a challenged restraint to determine whether it
restrains competition unreasonably. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1.
382
Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1455 (11 th Cir. 1991)
383
id.
38Id.
3
SMatsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
3'6Id. at 586.
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show the defendants' alleged exclusionary goal could not have been
obtained through independent action.387 In staff privilege cases, however,
both the hospital and the defendant physician often have independent
ability and incentives to exclude the plaintiff. If the defendant can
demonstrate separate motives for the exclusion, the alleged conspiracy will
not survive summary judgment under the Matsushita criteria unless the
plaintiff provides direct evidence of conspiracy.
MCO Exclusion of IMGs under Section 1
of the Sherman Act: Conspiracy
A showing of conspiracy may be even more difficult when the defendant
is a managed care organization rather than a hospital. Most managed care
organizations are generally considered joint ventures and it is well
established that restraints on competition are necessary for the joint
venture to achieve efficiencies, to control free riders or even to market
their product. Indeed, the only way managed care companies can control
costs is to selectively contract with providers, thereby establishing a
competitive bid situation reducing cost.388 For this reason, it is an accepted
fact that courts use the rule of reason standard to analyze alleged
conspiracies that restrain trade by ajoint venture.3'9 This standard requires
an analysis of the market impact relating to the exclusion and
consideration of any legitimate business reasons for the exclusion.
MCO Exclusion under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Because ofthe difficulties ofproving conspiracy under section 1, excluded
IMGs should consider whether section 2 is a more appropriate provision
under which to bring suit. According to the Supreme Court, an excluded
health care provider can bring a claim under section 2 only iftwo essential
elements are present: (1) the possession of monopoly power by an MCO
in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen or historic accident."'

387 d.
'3sId. at 576.
3 9

S 1d"

393AMatsushita, 475 U.S. at 576.
31'United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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Traditionally, it is the first element, market power, that has been the
primary barrier to unilateral refusal-to-deal claims.392
The Section 2 Conduct Requirement
In evaluating unilateral refusals to deal, one must first consider whether
the conduct element can be factually supported before undertaking the
more fact-intensive market analysis required to demonstrate the existence
of market power. Courts have used two types of tests to evaluate conduct
in a section 2 unilateral refusal to deal context: (1) the intent test, and (2)
the essential facility test.393 The intent test requires that the plaintiff
physician present evidence establishing both an anti-competitive
consequence to the alleged exclusion as well as the absence of a legitimate
business purpose.3 94 The intent test was most prominently applied by the
39 s
Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
In Aspen Skiing, the defendant operated three of the four ski areas in
Aspen, Colorado.396 The plaintiff operated the fourth.3 97 For many years
the parties offered an "all-Aspen" ski pass that allowed skiers to use all
four mountains. 398 At some point, the defendant refused to enter into the
joint agreement, forcing the plaintiff to market its ski package on its
own. 399 The defendant made an important change that adversely impacted
the market, and in the absence of any legitimate business justification, was
liable under section 2.400 Accordingly, the intent test should be used in
situations where the hospital or the managed care entity suddenly changes
the rules of the game to the detriment of the provider.
The second approach to satisfying the conduct element of a section
2 refusal to deal claim is to demonstrate that the excluded provider is
being denied access to an essential facility.401 In an excluded provider
case, at least one circuit court has held that a prerequisite to the application
of the essential facility test is an absence of legitimate business reasons for

3

92Id. at 571.
93

See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).

394

1d. at 587.
Sld.
3 96
id.
397id.
39

39

Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 585.

399Id

4
00Id
40 1

Id
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the exclusion.4 2 There does not appear to be any principled reason for this
prerequisite, and most courts have generally required only the following
four elements to establish liability under the essential facility test:
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist;
(2) a competitor's inability to practically orreasonably duplicate
the essential facility;
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor, and
(4) the feasibility of providing the facility. 3Thus, the essential facility test would require the provider to demonstrate
an absence of all viable alternative hospitals or managed care
opportunities, and prove that the absence has resulted in an absolute
bottleneck following the exclusion. Such a showing will be easier for
hospital-based providers such as anesthesiologists, but will be more
difficult for clinic-based providers like pediatricians. Moreover, in the
managed care context, the essential facility test may be even more difficult
to meet because it requires a showing of absolute monopoly power or a
showing of similar exclusion from all other managed care products.
Thus, a threshold issue for any excluded provider contemplating a
section 2 action is to establish that the exclusion interferes with a genuine
ability to provide medical services under either the intent test or the
essential facilities test. If this can be demonstrated, the remaining hurdle
for the plaintiff is to demonstrate is the defendant's possession of market
power.4'
1MGs and MCOs' Refusal to Deal
An IMG physician's membership denial may give rise to a boycott cause
of action against the MCO (or network). Lower federal courts have
applied the hybrid approach in several boycott cases involving the
exclusion ofphysicians and other health care professionals from a network

""'Willmanv. Heartland Hosp. East, 34 F.3d 605, 612-13 (8th Cir. 1994).
4

MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), ccrt. dcnicd,

464 U.S.
891 (1983).
41d.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol.2:461

if the network lacks market power and offers legitimate efficiency
justifications for the exclusion." 5
In an individual violation, for example, a single MCO refuses to deal
with one IMG. The court uses the rule of reason test; thus, it would be
almost impossible to show violation of antitrust law.40 6 On the other hand,
if an MCO or group of MCOs refuses to deal with a group of lMGs, then
the courts will probably use the per se violation rule; thus, it would be
easier to prove illegal violations because of the seriousness of the antitrust

violation. 407 The Court has also applied this formulation in a refusal to
deal with a health plan.40 8

Moreover, if the exclusion of an 1MG from a particular contract is
based on a unilateral payor decision, then the exclusion might be treated
as a vertical boycott and subjected to a less rigid analysis.40 9
Whatever the level of scrutiny employed by a court, the likelihood of
a successful antitrust challenge from the excluded physician is very small.
For example in Capital Imaging Associates, P.C. v. Mohawk Valley
MedicalAssociates,Inc. 410 a federal district court in New York held that
the exclusion of a radiology practice from participation in an HMO was

4

oSCapital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 546 (2d Cir.

1993) (upholding the use of a rule of reason analysis in an IPA's exclusion of radiologists due to
the IPA's lack of market power); Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1030-31 (91,
Cir. 1989), 868 F.2d at 1030-31 (applying a rule of reason analysis to claims that podiatrists had
been excluded from a health plan controlled by physicians, but finding that the refusal to admit
podiatrists as a class raised a reasonable inference to refute the defendant's efficiency
justification); Hassan v. Independent Practices Assocs., 698 F. F. Supp. at 693-94 (E.D. Mich.
1988) (allowing an IPA's exclusion of allergists to escape the per se rule by offering legitimate
efficiency justifications).
4
"Hassan, 698 F. Supp. at 693-94.
40
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,347 (1963); Fashion Originators' Guild
of Am.4 v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
' 81n FTC v. IndianaFederationof Dentists,472 U.S. 284, 296-298 (1985), the Supreme
Court examined a dental association's refusal to submit X-rays to insurance companies for
utilization
review under a truncated rule of reason approach.
4
091d.
410
1n CapitalImagingAssociates,P.C.v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 791 F. Supp.
956 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), Capital Imaging had applied for, but was denied, membership in an
independent practice association of member physicians (IPA), which was organized to provide
medical care to an HMO's policy holders. Capital sued both the IPA and the HMO on the theory
that they were engaged in an illegal conspiracy to exclude it from IPA membership to protect the
radiologists who were already members of the IPA. Id.
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not a violation of antitrust laws.4 1' This holding is consistent with at least
one earlier decision. In Barry -,. Bhle Cross of California,"' a federal
court of appeals affirmed a lower court's dismissal of the antitrust claims
brought by two physicians who argued the agreements between a Blue
Cross organization offering medical insurance and the physicians
participating in the plan unfairly foreclosed nonparticipating physicians
from doing business with patients insured by the plan.413 In rejecting this
claim, the appellate court observed that every contract between a buyer
and a seller of services has precisely the effect of which the physicians
complained. 41 4 The court further stated that when a buyer contracts with
one seller, the second seller no longer has access to the buyer's business
to the extent it is covered by an existing agreement.4 5 This consequence,
however, is not unlawful.
CONCLUSION
The growing popularity ofMCOs and their inherent love/hate relationship
with physicians will continue to change the fundamental structure of the
health care delivery system. Doing so raises many interesting legal
problems ranging from simple contract issues to discrimination and
antitrust. During the past few years, while MCOs tended to make the
health care delivery system more efficient, they also created major
problems for the physicians who maintain independent practices because
these physicians no longer have access to most patients. 41' Now, with
managed care, physicians' access to patients is on a wholesale basis
instead of the traditional retail basis. 41 7 As MCOs acquire more control
over access to patients, physicians run the risk of being deselected from

4
See Bhan v. NME Hosps., 929 F.2d 1404, 1414 (9th Cir.) (finding excluzxon of one
nurse-anesthetist insufficient to demonstrate actual detrimental effects), ccr. dentcd, 502 U.S. 994
(1991); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, 899 F.2d 951,960 (10th Cir.) (slating that

"the adverse impact must be on competition, not on any individual competitor or on plaintiff's
business"),
cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).
4t2
Barry v. Blue Cross of California, 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986).
id.
4 14
id.
4 13
4
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wVeiner, Forecasting the Effects of Health Reform on US Physician lMrforce

416 "

Requirements: Evidencefrom HMO Staffing Patterns,272 JAMA 222,227-28 (1994)
4
Montague, ManagedCareIs DumpingMany Physicians,but SomeAren't Goingto TaU'
ItLying Down, Hosps. & HEALTH NEToRKS, Oct. 20, 1994, at 38.
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physician panels.418 In particular, specialists depend on referrals from
primary care physicians and will find that their ability to practice medicine
depends entirely on managed care participation.419 Moreover, the
efficiency gained by managed care delivery systems has resulted in an
estimated thirty percent physician oversupply, especially among the
specialists. 420 As a result, MCOs who initially signed almost all
physicians requesting to be in the plan, are now deselecting or have
stopped selecting more physicians to their plan.
This practice appears to have had a disproportionately adverse impact
on IMG physicians because they are mostly specialists and have a history
of caring for poor and under-served patients who are known to be high risk
and more costly to treat. 42' Furthermore, IMGs are often considered
second class by their colleagues who were educated in the United States,
and over ninety percent of IMGs are foreign born, thus having foreign
complexions as well as accents.422 Considering that many powerful
private and government organizations are openly speaking against IMGs,
and IMGs as a group are unorganized and are unable to defend themselves,
they have became an easy target for MCO managers. 423 At this time, the
problem appears to be worse in open panel MCOs, and there is abundant
anecdotal evidence in support of the IMGs' claims of disparate
424
treatment.
This article discussed various legal theories available to IMGs,
including those based on contract, tort, state laws, anti-discrimination and
antitrust statutes. Based on this analysis, state physician fairness statutes
appear to be the most helpful laws and may offer some protection for
IMGs when they face wrongful exclusion or deselection from an MCO
plan. Also, contract law, especially the good faith dealing and public
policy doctrine could offer some remedy to IMGs. Anti-discrimination
and antitrust statutes may be used successfully if more than one IMG was
discriminated against.
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It should be noted that the foregoing discussion, with the exception
of the anti-discrimination statutes, could apply to any physician regardless
of his race, gender, national origin or country of medical education.
Moreover, if a physician is protected under Title VII, then the antidiscrimination statutes will also apply. Accordingly, discrimination need
not be toleratedby any physician involved in today's managed health care
environment.
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